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With ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine and previously perceived collective norms of post-Cold War Europe 
damaged, questions of cooperation continually plague stability. With the Organization of Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE– Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE prior to 1994) being one of the 
only actors able to facilitate minimal conflict mediation, a research focus on the institution raises questions of 
historical reconciliation and subsequently, interpretation of European security.  
 
This thesis adds to the existing body of knowledge by looking at implications of CSCE/OSCE institutionalization 
in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict, the possible application of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) in 
the region, and the subsequent narratives actors attempted to write through this process. As shown by recent OSCE 
Network Projects, contemplating narrative is critical when placing the CSCE/OSCE within a larger post-Cold War 
debate on historiography (Nünlist 2014; Nünlist, Aunesluoma, Zogg 2017; Zellner 2017). This study then tracks 
various actors’ interests in constructing new European conflict management structures and hence, a new meaning 
of European security after the Cold War.  
 
Politics in various participating states changed during the 1990’s and their new commitments to a common 
CSCE/OSCE narrative became complicated. Within this volatile period, former N+N (Neutral and Non-Allied) 
states, and momentarily former Warsaw Pact (WP) states, were the most noticeable supporters of new collective 
European security ideas through their advocacy for CSCE/OSCE institutional evolution. Though Russian and 
America also supported these visions, their interest in an institutionalized OSCE needed to be encouraged by 
numerous small states’ stalwart commitments to the ideas and norms of the early 1990’s. This helped institutionally 
solidify what are today critical aspects of the European security order. However, as none of these actors are 
monoliths and can be neatly grouped into strict analytical containers for long periods of time, institutionalization 
and norms became points of contention as political winds continued to shift. This story will be viewed from three 
different perspectives: sub-regional (South Caucasus), regional (greater European), and institutional 
(CSCE/OSCE).       
 
This research stems from an interdisciplinary background in political history, using archival materials, informal 
interviews, accounts of practitioners associated with the conflict, as well as an array of secondary sources. 
Constructivist theory on structural security from the Copenhagen School, Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT) (Buzan and Waever 2003), will be applied. In regards to narrative, strategic culture, salience of norms 
(Hecht 2016), and memory will be briefly employed to discuss how ideas may have influenced actors’ perception 
of a new ‘Europe’ in relation to security. This allows for an additional lens when attempting to represent small 
states’ perspectives and hence, narrative construction, of security providers in the post-Soviet space.  
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the European community has witnessed prolonged conflict, leading 
many observers to comment on the emergence of a new Cold War. When the crisis in 
Ukraine began in 2014, Christian Nünlist commented on the evolving confrontation as a 
result of departing narratives. Relevant to this study, he framed these narratives within the 
context of the Organization of Security and Cooperation (OSCE – Conference of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE prior to 1994):  
Diverging historical narratives on the evolution of the post-Cold War 
order in Europe have become a huge challenge for OSCE reform processes, and 
they remain a hurdle for overcoming East-West tensions. Radically different 
versions of how the cooperative security atmosphere of the early 1990s collapsed 
and led to unprecedented tension between the West and Russia in 2014 nourish 
mistrust within the OSCE.1 
This idea of contemporary conflict as a product of neglected historic reconciliation raises 
highly relevant questions in understanding said conflicts. A historical knowledge of how 
various actors constructed their discourse of Europe can color a contemporary analysis of 
confrontation in Europe. Not as a ‘new Cold War’, but rather an ongoing struggle with 
memory, acceptance of how the Cold War ended, and the way in which agreements under 
previous Russian, European, and American leadership have been implemented since. 
The conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) had implications for the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and consequently, was a significant conflict in Russia’s new identity 
struggle over sovereignty in the newly independent states (NIS). Because of this perceived 
temporal historic significance, the account presented here works to observe markers the 
mediation process left regarding how the post-Cold War security environment developed. 
While there is a wide range of analysis on the mediation process, conclusions tend to 
generalize around the perspective aptly presented by Thomas De Waal in 2010: Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are not ready for a resolution and there is little interest in resolving the 
conflict in the international community.2 While this may be true, a large portion of any 
resolution stems from the negotiation between Russia and various OSCE participating 
states for the rights to militarily mediate the conflict after any political agreement is made, 
also referred to as a peacekeeping operation (PKO). De Waal and many other authors touch 
                                                          
1 Nünlist, Christian (2014): Helsinki +40 in the Historical Context. Security and Human Rights. No. 25. 207. 
2 De Waal, Thomas (2010): Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. Survival, August-September 
2010. Vol 52. No 4. 174-175. 
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on this, but neglect to grasp the significance the mediation process had on the perceptions 
of various small states who invested themselves in a CSCE/OSCE resolution process. By 
investigating the narrative these actors created within the NK mediation process, an 
additional discourse can be added to the historiographical discussion on how Europe was 
defined in terms of security after the Cold War, as well as how such a process unfolded.  
1.1 Literature Review 
 A brief overview of the influential interpretations from the respective fields of 
CSCE/OSCE Studies and perceptions of Russian peacekeeping as they appear in the OSCE 
literature and Western conceptualization will be surveyed. They are both significant in 
shaping the analysis of archival narratives also presented here. CSCE/OSCE studies cover 
many aspects of the organization, but there are few comprehensive historic accounts of the 
NK conflict mediation narratives and their institutional implications. Perceptions of 
Russian peacekeeping highlights how various Western interpretations of Russia as a 
security provider may have been influenced by ingrained memories of the Soviet Union and 
the Cold War. Together, these sets of literature account for the foundation for which this 
study will proceed from. 
OSCE Studies 
A majority of contemporary literature in the field of OSCE studies focuses on the 
functionality and relevance of the OSCE in a changing Europe. Academic researchers such 
as Wolfgang Zellner, Stefan Lehne, and Christian Nünlist have taken up or participated in a 
growing initiative for deeper historical investigation of a post-Cold War CSCE/OSCE. 
These projects tend to be produced under the auspices of the OSCE Network, a system of 
academic institutions that work as “an autonomous OSCE-related track II initiative.”3 One 
more recent project looks to further examine the ways in which narratives of various 
participating states influenced perceptions of and trust within the OSCE.  
Wolfgang Zellner recently edited a volume outlining different security narratives 
present in Europe and is highly relevant to the presentation of strategic culture utilized 
                                                          
3 OSCE Network (2015): Who We Are. OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions. http://osce-
network.net/about/. (accessed January 5, 2018.) 
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here.4 From a critical perspective, the historical period of narrative analysis utilized by 
many of Zellner’s contributors is mainly contemporary, not taking into account deeper 
cultural and social factors that may shape political narratives. Along with Zellner, Nünlist is 
a proponent of a historical reappraisal of narratives, memory, and various historiographical 
divergences that shaped the OSCE of today. Along with the 2014 publication mentioned in 
the opening, Nünlist most recently produced a report on two OSCE Network oral history 
workshops, which discussed “the ‘Road to Paris’ with high-level eyewitnesses who… 
negotiated the 1990 Paris Charter in Vienna and New York.”5 These works and wider 
OSCE Network initiatives set a frame of investigation for smaller discourses to be extracted 
from the perceived history of CSCE/OSCE growth. The work here attempts to place itself 
within this project, beginning the exploration of a smaller, more nuanced story within the 
overarching divergence of European post-Cold War securities narratives.   
A large portion of the literature in OSCE studies is from historic actors associated 
with the institution. These accounts are some of the most telling pieces of literature and 
without them the archival documents would be nothing more than a skeleton for the 
depiction this thesis presents. With these personal opinion pieces from the 1990’s, the 
divergence of narratives appears as a process that was apparent from the early stages of 
CSCE/OSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh.  These sources are interpreted with a 
cognizance of their bias, but nevertheless, they give further insight into the security interest 
and narrative individual states attempted to write in specific periods of history.  
 Some of the main actors documented in this thesis include: Margaretha af Ugglas, 
Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs 1991-1994 and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office 1993, 
Tarja Halonen, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs 1995-2000 (Finland co-chaired the 
Minsk Group from 1995-1996).6 Terhi Hakala, Counselor to the Finnish Co-Chairmanship 
of the OSCE Minsk Group 1995, Heikki Vilén, Finnish General and Chair of the HLPG 
                                                          
4 Zellner, Wolfgang (ed.) (2017): Security Narratives in Europe: A Wide Range of Views. The Institute for 
Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Nomos. Hamburg, Germany. 
5 Nünlist, Christian; Aunesluoma, Juhana; Zogg, Benno (2017): The Road to the Charter of Paris: Historical 
Narratives and Lessons for the OSCE Today. OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic institutions. 
Vienna, Austria. 9 
6 The Minsk Group was established in 1992 as a preparatory conference for negotiations on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and was eventually given a formal mandate as the Minsk Group at the 1994 Budapest 
Summit. This hybrid conference planning organ and political medium became the OSCE’s main forum for 
facilitating mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
 Reynolds 6 
 
(High Level Planning Group)7 from 1995-1996, Andrei Zagorski, Member of the Soviet 
CSCE delegation from 1987-1991, and John J. Maresca, Member of the US Delegation to 
CSCE negotiations form 1973-75, US Ambassador to the CSCE 1989-1992, and US 
Ambassador/Special Representative to the NK conflict mediation process, 1992-1994. 
While these actors’ accounts are significant in the construction of narratives presented here, 
they should be understood as incantations of specific memories, cultivated due to and part 
of particular social and collective memories.8 
Most significant for some of these actors are their origins in the previous N+N 
block (Neutral and Non-Aligned), exhibiting small states continued influence on the CSCE 
and new conflict management structures. Following her chairmanship of the CSCE in 1993, 
af Ugglas warned of the influence Russia would have on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as 
well as the organization if it was not countered by other states with an interests in 
sustaining the CSCE process.9  Halonen, Hakala, and Vilén are all part of the pivotal period 
in OSCE institutionalization and PKO planning; Finland in 1995 continued the work of 
Sweden as the previous Minsk Conference Co-Chair and was responsible for leading initial 
PKO planning. Hakala commented on the transition and the continued wariness of Russian 
national interests in the region and a need for Finland to convince Russia that a UN or 
OSCE based peace was in their best interest.10 Vilén’s perspective is also provocative 
because he not only speaks about the plausibility of a PKO, but also the mistrust that was 
growing among Minsk Group members. In the words of Vilén, one particular participating 
state was sharing classified military information with the conflicting parties.11 The 
commonality of these accounts is their subtlety in imply concern about Russia as a divisive 
mediator in terms of the perceived agreements of the early 1990’s. The timing of these 
accounts is also interesting as it gives a perspective on memory and strategic culture in a 
                                                          
7 An OSCE organ given a mandate at the 1994 Budapest Summit for preliminary military planning of any 
OSCE PKO in NK. 
8 Cubitt, Geoffrey (2007): History and Memory. Manchester University Press. Manchester, UK. 34, 39-40.  
9 Af Ugglas, Margaretha (1994): Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy. In: Carlsson, Staffan (ed.) 
The Challenges of Preventative Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE.  Norstedts Tryckeri AB, Swedish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm. 27. 
10 Hakala, Terhi (1998): The OSCE Minsk Process: A Balance after Five Years. Helsinki Monitor. Vol 9, Is 5. 
Netherlands Helsinki Committee. 9. 
11 Vilén, Heikki (1997): ETYJ:n kriisinhallintamekanismit ja mahdollisuudet yhteistyöhön kriisien 
toimijoiden kanssa. In: Rauhanturvaamisen muuttuvat kasvot: oppeja tulevaisuudelle. Puolustusministeriön 
Julkaisuja. Helsinki, Finland. NRO 1/1997. 118. 
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volatile historic moment, rather than a contemporary solicitation shaped by two decades of 
memory politics and collective identity modifications. 
On the Russian side of the account, in 1991 and 1992 Zagorski viewed the new 
European commitment to the CSCE from a perspective critical of Gorbachev’s faith in the 
West, alluding to the shifting narratives in Russia during the 1990’s. Zagorski offered an 
astute reading of the evolving debate over American interest in NATO as a primary security 
institution and the French story of the EC. For Zagorski, this reading led to dwindling 
hopes for a strong CSCE and hence, Russia as an integral part of Europe.12 More recently, 
as a Moscow State Institution of International Relations (MGIMO) scholar, Zagorski 
participated in the OSCE Network ‘Road to Paris’ oral history project described above. 
Here he commented on Russian interpretations of the critical juncture in CSCE and 
European security formation.13 Also within this project, he reflects on Moscow’s 
perfunctory understanding of such contemporary historical reconciliation projects.14 
From the American perspective, Maresca offers an in-depth analysis of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as the CSCE/OSCE’s growing involvement in conflict 
resolution. The various books and essays Maresca wrote are very close to the topical 
content of this thesis. However, the thesis here attempts to be a critical reflection on various 
narratives, while Maresca offers mnemonic accounts of his personal experience as a 
negotiator.15 Because of this, Maresca’s interpretations must be understood as memories 
shaped by a particular life, cultural, and political experience, rather than the “historic 
realities” and teleological “European evolution” he often refers to.16 For example, in his 
first incantation of the Geneva negotiations of 1973-75 he focuses on the US as a primary 
                                                          
12 Zagorski, Andrei (1991): New European Unity: The End of the CSCE? Paradigms. Vol. 5, Is. 1. 76-88; 
Zagorski, Andrei (1992): New Institutions and Structures of the CSCE: Adjusting to the New Europe. 
Paradigms. Vol. 6, Is. 2. 12-25. 
13 Nünlist, Christian; Aunesluoma, Juhana; Zogg, Benno (2017): The Road to the Charter of Paris: Historical 
Narratives and Lessons for the OSCE Today. OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic institutions. 
Vienna, Austria. 26. 
14 Zagorski, Andrei (2017): Russian Narratives. In: Wolfgang Zellner (ed.) Security Narratives in Europe, A 
Wide Range of Views. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. 
Hamburg, Germany. 99. 
15 See: Maresca, John J. (1985): To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-
1975. Duke University Press; Maresca, John J. (1996): Lost Opportunities in Negotiating the Conflict over 
Nagorno Karabakh. International Negotiation. Vol. 1, Is. 3. 471-499; Maresca, John J. (2016): Helsinki 
Revisited: A Key U.S. Negotiator's Memoirs on the Development of the CSCE into the OSCE. Ibidem, 
verlag. Stuttgart, Germany. 
16 Maresca 2016, 3-8. 
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actor, arguing that the US allowed the Europeans to take the lead due to US disinterest, US 
perceptions of the conference’s eventual failure, and US preference for direct bilateral 
negotiations with the USSR.17 But in his later memoirs he focuses on endorsing a European 
memory of the conference, arguing how the US-led NATO relationship empowered 
European countries to take on an independent role. The US stood in the background so as to 
support Western Europe’s relationships with the USSR, hence supporting the first unified 
European negotiating position since WWII.18 Because of these subtle shifts in memory, his 
accounts are viewed critically. This allows for a contemplation of how various factors 
including time, as well as new readings of history, influence memory.  
 In regards to this specific topic of OSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
issue of an OSCE PKO, many works mention the significance of the initial Helsinki II 
(Helsinki 1992 Summit) PKO mandate. However, few look at the implications within a 
longer institutional narrative. Rexane Dehdashti gives a very compelling analysis of the 
negotiations and the likelihood of a multinational OSCE PKO being implemented.19 This 
perspective, published in 1997 (in reality written in 1995 and only updated as late as 
September 15, 1996),20 is interesting as it directly follows what can be considered the end 
of a period of high political will resulting from the collapse of the USSR.  Larissa Daria 
Meier comments on a very similar narrative, but does so as of 2016.21 She utilizes many of 
the same documents to be presented in this study, but comes to different conclusions 
because of, as this thesis will attempt to present, a selective reading of the OSCE Archive. 
Meier presents documentation from periods of high political will and high OSCE prestige 
1992, 1993-95, and 2002-2003. Because of this, she values particular documents over 
others and comes to conclusions that are not always supported by the document narrative as 
a whole or the memories of key actors responsible for shaping the OSCE PKO. Meier 
                                                          
17 Maresca 1985, 64 
18 Maresca 2016, 13, 22, 36. 
19 Dehdashti, Rexane (1997): Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case-study of OSCE Conflict Settlement. In: Bothe, 
Michael; Ronzitti, Natalino; Rosas, Allan (ed.) The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: 
Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Kluwer Law International. 
The Hague, Netherlands. 459-479. 
20 Bothe, Michael; Ronzitti, Natalino; Rosas, Allan (ed.) (1997): The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and 
Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Kluwer Law 
International. The Hague, Netherlands. 
21 Meier, Larissa Daria (2015): A Role for OSCE Peacekeeping?: From the 1992 Helsinki Guidelines to the 
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. CORE Working Paper 27. Institute for Peace Research and Security 
Policy at the University of Hamburg. Hamburg, Germany. 
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sometimes neglects the perspectives of small states within larger entities such as the EU, 
further simplifying the PKO debate.22 One result of Meier’s presentation is the under-
appraisal of institutional evolution and subsequently the institution as an actor. This 
disallows a comparison of the OSCE in periods of low political will and a nuanced analysis 
of deeper reasoning behind specific statements.  
Western Perceptions of Russian Peacekeeping 
Russian Peacekeeping is a larger subset of literature that will only be partially 
covered here. The majority of English language literature on Russian Peacekeeping in the 
1990’s centers around two main conclusions: Russian PKOs legitimized Russia's 
humanitarian power in a post-Cold War international order, while simultaneously 
reasserting Russia's position as a security guarantor in the post-Soviet space. These points 
are presented and analyzed by journalists and academics, working similarly to the academic 
researcher, practitioner dichotomy presented in the previous section 
Journalists who covered the conflict gave an interesting perspective on Russian 
peacekeeping, as their sources were usually locals affected by the conflict. According to 
Nünlist, journalists also “play an important role in fostering (historical) empathy or its 
lack.”23 Thus journalists have the ability to add supposedly authoritative accounts for the 
further formation of various narratives.  
Journalist Michael Mihalka summarized the perceived ability of Russia to produce 
peacekeeping forces directly after the Soviet Union dissolved.24 His account was published 
in 1996 when the security architecture of a Russian centered Regional Security Complex 
(RSC) potentially hung in the balance. Mihalka succinctly put the conversation of Russia 
peacekeeping in the context of an OSCE proposed PKO and the recent Dayton accords. 
Thomas De Wall, another journalist focusing on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
corroborates many of Mihalka’s assertions regarding the inability of Russian peacekeeping 
in the 1990’s. He also gives in-depth accounts of how the collapse of Soviet power actually 
played out.25 These accounts give a richer image of the regional situation in which 
international negotiations were beginning to take shape. They also offer insight into how 
                                                          
22 Meier 2015, 30. 
23 Nünlist, Aunesluoma, and Zogg 2017, 32. 
24 Mihalka, Michael (1996): Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian Peacekeeping: Prospects for a Second Dayton. 
International Peacekeeping. Vol. 3, No. 3. Autumn 1996. 25. 
25 De Waal, Thomas (2013): Black Garden. New York University Press. New York 
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the perceptions of Western audiences were formed about Russia’s potential as a post-Soviet 
security provider. 
Nadia Kirilova Milanova, former head of the OSCE Prague Office, outlined Russian 
peacekeeping priorities in regard to Nagorno-Karabakh with an emphasis on economic 
interests. This is the closest piece of regional analysis to the work being written here, albeit 
without the argumentation on institutional evolution. Milanova highlights one narrative 
presented in the 1990’s, where Russia considered itself a first among equals in the post-
Soviet Space. Transcaucasia was considered “a post-imperial space where Russia will 
defend its interests by all means, including military and economic.” 26 She outlines Russian 
ideas as influential in reconstructing a Russian-Caucasian RSC. A more contemporary 
study by Vadim Romshov and Helena Rytövuori-Apunen also investigates Russian 
regional economic interests and their relation to NK. Contrariwise, this account passes over 
the interconnectedness of economic interest and a PKO that Milinova discusses.27 Though 
economics is not a critical aspect of the analysis presented here, Milanova as well as 
Romshov and Rytövuori-Apunen comment on the various different discourses the PKO and 
NK mediation stories touch. 
1.2 Enquiry at Hand 
In attempting to add a new perspective to the field, this work proceeds with the 
following research question: how did the CSCE/OSCE’s attempt to create a mediation 
structure for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with specific focus on the proposed OSCE 
multinational PKO, influence the institution as well as participating states perception of 
European security? As this is a far reaching question and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
spans over three decades, the research period of 1990-2004 will be utilized. The years of 
document analysis will begin in 1990 with the CSCE Charter of Paris, which marked a new 
stimulus in creating a post-post-war Europe. 2004 will be used as the end date, being the 
year when all former WP countries were fully incorporated into NATO and all except 
Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. For many former WP states, acceptance into the EU 
                                                          
26 Milanova, Nadia Kirilova (2002): The Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh 1992-2002: Ten Years of Missed 
Conflict Resolution Opportunities. The University of Exeter, Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in Politics. Exeter, UK. 174. 
27 Romashov, Vadim and Rytövuori-Apunen, Helena (2016): Russia’s Karabakh policy: new momentum in 
regional perspective. Caucasus Survey. Vol. 5, Is. 2. 1-17. 
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and NATO were the security guarantees they had been looking for in the early 1990’s, but 
were only offered membership into the CSCE as a placeholder.28 OSCE institutions will be 
the main archival chronicles investigated, looking at the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), 
Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), High Level Planning Group (HLPG) from their 
appropriate year of establishment in the early 1990’s until 2004. 
In the process of validating this research question, the following assertions will be 
addressed: the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a pivotal environment for the CSCE/OSCE 
to build institutions and legitimacy in an attempt to construct a ‘common European home’ 
idealized in the last 1980’s and early 1990’s. Small states with a historically traceable 
commitment to the CSCE/OSCE paradigm of security looked to hold Russia to its re-
interpretations of the Helsinki Decalogue commitments under Gorbachev. These 
commitments entailed human rights and the abdication of ‘inviolability of internal affairs’ 
as a new foundation for European security. While small states sustained enough support in 
periods of low political will to maintain an OSCE envisioned in 1990, they lacked the 
political force necessary to motivate continued cooperation on conflict resolution in the 
region. Debates over what norms should embody a new Europe materialized through the 
competition over the right to mediate and administer post-conflict measures (PKO) in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. These assertions frame OSCE institutionalization within a wider 
context framing the struggles of a post-Cold War Europe. 
The CSCE/OSCE, based on consensus politics and consequently political equality 
of participating states, had a vision of bridging the divide between the great powers during 
the Cold War and building a new cooperative security architecture. Though some states 
may have believed in this vision more than others, such idealist cooperation was at the core 
of Helsinki 1975 and CSCE/OSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Small states were 
critical in the establishment of the Final Act in 1975 as well as the continued life and 
prestige of the conference. Consequently, this thesis will affirm that small actors had the 
ability to shape a budding European security community and sustain norms of OSCE 
conflict management and dialogue for future windows of opportunity. 
                                                          
28 Lehne, Stefan (1991): The CSCE in the 1990’s: Common European House or Potemkin Village? 
Braumüller Publishing, Vienna. 30. 
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1.3 Methodology 
 The use of history as a social science has become a point of reflection in recent 
decades. Theorists in social science fields such as international relations and security 
studies claim to utilize history as empirical evidence to validate their theoretical 
argumentation. While this is partially true, some fail to go further than “data mining” or 
reading a historical narrative that validates their claim.29 In opposition to trends aimed at 
quantifying social science, the idea of historical institutionalism (HI) is useful in addressing 
the above mentioned research question. Institutions and ideas play a key role in 
understanding the story actors chose to write for themselves. Therefore they are useful in 
studying the CSCE/OSCE as an institution whose legitimacy primarily stems from the 
power of norms.30 Finally, a conversation on narrative as a form of historiography is also 
critical in understanding how ideas of European security were conceived by different actors 
and subsequently, the story they attempted to write as a result of these perceptions.  
While not strictly a methodology, HI represents a strain of historical inquiry that 
elevates the significance of ideas in organizations as a way of understanding institutional 
change. The significance of HI here is that it frames the research question in the 
overarching question of “why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome 
occurred.” It also focuses on actors as norm-abiding as well as self-interested, adding 
explanatory value to interactions within the frame of the CSCE/OSCE. 31 The perception of 
actors as such helps explain why Russia and former WP states remained responsive to the 
CSCE process, even while interpretations of what ideas should shape a post-Cold War 
Europe continued to diverge.  
In an attempt to see the application of ideas fundamental to HI in practice, within 
the institution, a variety of interpretive experiences helped color the historic analysis 
presented in this thesis. These institutional experiences include researching at the OSCE 
Archive, participating in a 2016 OSCE Documentation Workshop, attending the OSCE 24th 
Annual Economic and Environmental Forum, and attending OSCE presentations in 
                                                          
29 Franzosi, Roberto (2006): Historical Knowledge and Evidence. The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 
Political Analysis. Oxford University Press, New York. 444. 
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Helsinki as well as OSCE lectures in Kazan, Russia. This author was also allowed informal 
interviews with Czech, Finnish, and American diplomats, Swedish parliamentarians, and 
OSCE employees.32  
As the timeframe of this study is from 1990-2004, the ability to interview historic 
actors was sparse, but good amounts of documents recounting personal experiences were 
available. As mentioned earlier, there is additional value in using written recollections of 
mediation as opposed to contemporary invocations, which have experienced two decades of 
diverging narratives. As Geoffrey Cubitt argues, “different interactive settings may actually 
promote different patterns of recollection in the individuals who are involved in them.”33 
Additionally, interpretations of these experiences and presentations inherently hold the 
personal bias of this writer. Therefore, this work should be classified more so with textual 
interpretation as associated with the linguistic and cultural turn in the historic discipline, 
rather than quantitative social science.  
Archival work was undertaken both on the OSCE internet archive,34 as well as on 
two trips to the physical OSCE Prague Archive in March 2016 and August 2016. 
Additional visits were made to the archive during the fall of 2016, allowing for follow up 
on various research threads. The archive is available to registered researchers under the 
OSCE Researcher-in-Residence Program. Documents have three statuses: Open, OSCE+, 
or Restricted. OSCE+ and Restricted cannot be quoted, but researchers may take notes and 
extract information for their research. The information obtained from these documents must 
be paraphrased in the author’s own terms.35   
Narrative 
Several authors have proposed narrative reflection as a form of peace-resolution 
strategy, as alluded to by Nünlist. Authors such as Riikka Kuusisto have applied this 
thinking on narrative construction in a literary and indirectly historiographical sense to 
                                                          
32 All of the interviews referenced here were conducted off the record in an informal manner. None of the 
opinions will be quoted or referenced, but they were significant in helping this author interpret how different 
states constructed narratives of the past. 
33 Cubitt 2007, 129 
34 The online archive can be found at this web address: http://www.osce.org/resources/documents 
35 Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat (2016): Recommendations for quoting OSCE documents and using 
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contemporary actors or states. This helps to understand how factions within the state 
construct personal narratives and thus, the reality in which they make decisions.36 The idea 
of narrative construction as an edifice of reality is closely tied to the post-structural 
understanding of reality as a text, as well as a constructivist understanding of international 
politics in the Wendtian sense.37 The constructivist logic found here pairs nicely with HI 
and the belief that “ideas are the very root of political behavior.”38  In this line of 
argumentation, how actors conceptualize their realities is crucial in understanding conflict.  
Intellectual historian George Iggers presents a basis for understanding narrative 
construction in historical discourse by quoting Hayden White. He asserts that while history 
uses “empirically validated facts, it necessarily requires imaginative steps to place them in a 
coherent story,” therefore “a fictional element enters into all historical discourse.”39 This 
understanding of narrative construction is significant when applied to how actors interpret 
their own history. Interest may cause a willing neglect of or specific form of critical self-
reflection and construction of memory fundamental in narrative construction.  For HI, 
understanding the fictional account of the past actors write is significant because 
understanding the effect of past ideas is crucial in assessing self-interest in the future.40 
 From a historiographical perspective, it is also important to note that the past can 
never truly be known. As Kant argued in “The Critique of Pure Reason,” knowledge of 
reality is only obtained through perception, therefore one can never truly know reality as 
such. When this was applied to historical knowledge, the idea of a scientific objectivity 
became even more absurd to a section of the community.41 States as actors are inherently 
biased by a national interest and various cultural beliefs, but this bias is a primary 
component of narrative creation. From a constructivist’s perspective, this bias is also 
crucial in understanding how individual and historic consciousness is fashioned. The 
interpretation of the ideas which came to define CSCE/OSCE institutionalization are 
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38 Steinmo 2008, 130. 
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40 Steinmo 2008, 133. 
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paramount in understanding actors as dynamic agents with different interpretations of 
reality, and hence conflict, rather than monoliths stuck in time. An actor’s bias becomes a 
valued, if not necessary part of history as it allowed the presentation of abstract thoughts, 
outlining each actor’s method of arriving at her/his perceived frame of reality.   
In line with the various turns in the historical discipline, the account presented here 
should be considered simply as a new discourse being added to a variety of other ‘historical 
flows’.42 As the past can never fully be known, this discourse will interpret archival 
documents and primary accounts of the mediation process, endeavoring to assemble the 
narratives specific actors wanted to write themselves into within the CSCE/OSCE. A 
deeper historiographical understanding of past CSCE/OSCE narratives can help others read 
why Russian narrative construction has become so polarized from the rest of Europe and 
vice versa. That being said, this work is itself a narrative where efforts of literary 
imagination were necessary in connecting the document and source interpretation into a 
coherent story for the reader.  
The historiographical frame where this analysis stems from is the Cold War 
Research Cluster undertaken by the Aleksanteri Institute at the University of Helsinki 2010-
2014.43 This form of historiography focuses on looking at history not through the traditional 
lens of international relations and diplomacy. Rather it focuses on smaller states and an 
understanding of agency such actors have in historic social structures.44 This frame is also 
closely associated with Michael Cox’s renewed research focus on Europe and various small 
states as primary actors in both the Cold War, and the construction of a new ‘Europe’.45 
 Thus, an investigation of narrative within the frame of HI will direct this study 
towards an understanding of one of the discourses that influenced the contemporary crisis 
of cooperation within the CSCE/OSCE. Narratives within the CSCE/OSCE can be 
understood as a representation of the ideas actors believe, which are not resigned to the 
institution, but rather underlie a variety of discourses actors construct. The CSCE/OSCE is 
                                                          
42 Iggers 1999, 103. 
43 See: Autio-Sarasmo, Sari and Humphreys, Brendan (2010): Winter Kept us Warm: Cold War Interactions 
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merely a useful repository where pieces of these narrative constructions have been 
archived. By looking at Nagorno-Karabakh as one section of the larger story, some of the 
trees (discourses) can be further examined to add to a larger investigation of the forest, 
which is the historiography of post-Cold War Europe. 
1.4 Theory  
Regional Security Complex Theory 
This thesis will apply Buzan’s and Waever’s Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT). This theoretical frame will be applied to the relationship between Russia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, as well as other OSCE participating states, which do not necessarily 
have a regional interest in the Caucuses, but rather an interest in the OSCE as a security 
paradigm. RSCT will also help frame the discussion of a potential OSCE PKO and how 
Russia and various small states both interpreted and interacted with OSCE PKO planning 
throughout the OSCE’s institutional evolution. 
Buzan’s and Waever’s theory of RSCT is “a framework [for] organizing empirical 
studies of regional security.”46 From a historian’s perspective, this theory is highly relevant 
for the following thesis because it is useful for writing structural history.47 From a 
methodological perspective, it pairs nicely with HI because it gives further solidity for 
contemplating how various conceptions of security interacted within the CSCE/OSCE.  
Buzan and Waever align their thought of structuralist studies within a constructivist 
school (Copenhagen School), similar to Alexander Wendt’s ideas that the state is an actor 
who is given agency through those that represent its interests, such as diplomats.48 Buzan 
and Waever, in a similar manner, look at how non-traditional security issues become 
securitized. The approach has clearly turned constructivist in the sense that it does not ask 
whether a certain issue is in and of itself a ‘threat’, but focus on the question of when and 
under what conditions who securitizes what issues. The act of labeling something a security 
issue – or a threat – transforms this issue and it is therefore in the political process of 
securitization that distinct security dynamics originate. “Thus, it is possible to formulate a 
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Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. 51. 
47 Ibid., 52. 
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theory that is not dogmatically state-centric in its premises, but is often somewhat state-
centric in its findings .”49  The CSCE/OSCE is a primary research subject for this form of 
securitization for two reasons. The first being the different issues the CSCE/OSCE 
acknowledges as security questions. By having an institutional recognition of a wide array 
of issues that influence collective security, such as political-military (Basket I), 
environmental and economic (Basket II), and the human dimension (Basket III), it is easier 
for participating states to discuss all concerns as a corollary to securitization. Additionally, 
securitization occurs because of context, which here is interpreted to mean ideas. Narratives 
and ideas of European security are a driving factor in understanding why specific issues, 
such as OSCE intervention in the post-Soviet Space, became securitized at some historic 
moments, but not others. Buzan and Waever use terms such as penetration, meaning when 
an actor from outside the RSC infiltrates with their ideas, or overlay, when interests 
transcend mere penetration and change the patterns of local security norms.50 In this 
analysis, these terms are closely associated with securitization and how Russia read 
initiatives of CSCE/OSCE participating states, as well as vis-a-versa.  
 RSCT consists of three main sets of interpretive variants. The first being the four 
levels of analysis to be looked at: 1) Domestic 2) state-to-state 3) region-to-region 4) role of 
global powers.51 The second being the four variables that compose the essential structure of 
a Regional Security Complex (RSC):  
1) Boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbors  
2) Anarchic structure, which means the RSC must be composed of two or more 
autonomous units 
3) Polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units  
4) Social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the 
units.  
Finally, RSCT proposes three possible evolutions 
1) Maintenance of the status quo, which means that there are no significant changes 
in its essential structure 
2) Internal transformation, which means that changes in essential structure occur 
within the context of its existing outer boundary. This could mean changes to the 
anarchic structure (because of regional integration); to polarity (because of 
disintegration, merger, conquest, differential growth rates, or suchlike); or to the 
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dominant patterns of amity/enmity (because of ideological shifts, war-weariness, 
changes of leadership, etc.)  
3) External transformation, which means that the outer boundary expands or 
contracts, changing the membership of the RSC, and most probably transforming 
its essential structure ion other ways. The most obvious way for this to happen is 
if two RSCs merge.52 
After setting this initial theoretical frame, Buzan and Weaver make the differentiation 
between different types of RSCs, or how a security complex is administered: standard 
RSCs, centered RSCs, great power RSCs, and supercomplexes. For the purpose of this 
analysis, only centered and supercomplexes will be relevant. Centered RSCs take four 
forms: superpower, great power, regional power, and institutional. The first two focus on 
uni-polarity, where a global level power dominates the region. Examples include the US in 
North America for a superpower centered RSC, and Russia in the CIS for a great power 
centered RSC. Regional power centered RSC have yet to exist and institutional centered 
RSC focus on regions that acquire ‘actor level quality’ through institutions, such as the EU. 
The other RSC of interest is supercomplexes, which are characterized as “strong 
interregional level of security dynamics arising from great power spillover into adjacent 
regions [defined by] East and South Asia.”53 Supercomplexes do not exist in the region of 
this thesis’ analysis, but the supercomplex idea is useful in considering the idealism of a 
common European home and the subsequent conflict management structures, which certain 
actors attempted to construct around conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Though this theory was presented in 2001, Russia can still be considered a centered 
RSC due to its continued predominance in the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU). All of these institutions and relations contain various securitized issues ranging 
from economics to hard security, which are still dependent on Russia as a center. These 
historic relationships and Russia’s support for its near abroad, either through cheap energy 
or interconnectedness through migrant worker populations, builds further amity towards 
Russia as a security provider, and hence, a Russian centered RSC.  
In the above structural terms of RSCT, the OSCE is a highly prevalent organization 
because it pushes RSCT further from the traditional top-down approach of viewing a post-
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Cold War security order. 54 As a non-state actor, the OSCE is an institution part of the EU 
institutional RSC, but also the Russian centered RSC. It was founded on an idealist vision 
to bridge the two RSCs. While the vision of creating a supercomplex may have been short 
lived during the 1990’s, the mission of forming a type of inter-complex structure, 
somewhere between a centered RSC, institutional RSC, and supercomplex, remains. After 
this brief vision of a new security structure and shifting domestic politics in former Soviet 
states, many issues became further securitized, even the basic idea of ‘Europe’ agreed upon 
under Gorbachev.  
Salience of Norms 
In regards to norms, ideas, and institutional evolution, the supposition of Catherin 
Hecht is useful for discussing narratives based on normative commitments during liminal 
historic periods. Hecht argues that in multilateral organizations such as the CSCE/OSCE, 
“the practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed 
proposals contributed to agreements on the codification of new norms even during short 
windows of opportunity, particularly when recurring meetings enabled groundwork to be 
done in advance.”55 This can be taken as a commentary on the agreement of norms in 1975 
in the Helsinki Final Act and the prolonged debate over the implementation of the three 
baskets throughout the conference’s history. The eventual recodification of norms and 
expansion of the Helsinki Decalogue to negate the interpretation of ‘sanctity of internal 
affairs’ in 1991 is also read as a reassertion of norms, albeit a Western interpretation of 
original commitments. The reunification of Germany is also viewed in this light. The 
various reassertions of proposals by small states after 1989, while initially denied in the 
atmosphere of block politics from 1973-1989, came to be the foundation of the OSCE in 
the 1990’s. Additionally, Hecht argues “re-endorsing or elaborating norms is significant in 
IOs with large, heterogeneous compositions, because high levels of support communicate 
norms’ legitimacy, signal states’ re-commitment, and convey broad expectations of 
compliance.”56 This conclusion will be applied to the discussion of OSCE institutional 
evolution. Conversely, by reaffirming the norms of Paris 1990, a specific narrative is 
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identified that sheds light on why OSCE involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh may have 
become further securitized and viewed as penetration by Russia. 
Strategic culture 
 The pseudo-theoretical perspective of strategic culture also complements RSCT. 
While there are generally three generations of thought recognized in regards to strategic 
culture, this thesis will align with a form closest to the first generation, which focuses on 
the analysis of ideas. It is defined as: shared beliefs, norms or ideas within a society that 
generate expectations in security and defense policy. Thus, a society’s security identity can 
be expressed through its behavioral patterns resulting from shared experiences and the 
accepted narratives of a security community. 57 This definition adds explanatory value to 
the argumentation asserting that the CSCE/OSCE evolved as a result of how actors viewed 
themselves within a European narrative. A look at how interaction within the CSCE either 
worked with or against self-perceptions of strategic culture, and hence their place in a 
larger European narrative after 1989, gives further figure to the questions of HI. It also 
gives another frame for understanding and analyzing how and why the CSCE/OSCE 
involved itself in the post-Soviet space, as well as why member states pursued a new 
Helsinki Decalogue for defining a common European strategic culture or collective 
memory. 
That being said, strategic culture as a theoretical and analytical tool holds some 
ambiguity. It has undergone a variety of debate since its initial inception in 1970, retaining 
a certain amount of uncertainty in regards to its methodology, and hence explanatory 
power.58 There is also uncertainty about how far back to look when considering cultural, 
political, and economic influence on strategic culture, leading to further ambiguity on what 
actually comprises strategic culture.59 For example, when looking at Finland, Antti Seppo 
and Tuomas Forsberg comment that the positive self-perception of ‘defense’ in Finnish 
strategic culture stems from the heroic fight against the Soviet Union in 1930’s and 
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1940’s.60 Derek Fewster highlights similar tropes of defense stemming from the national 
Enlightenment period and the literary construction of ancient Finland as associated with 
self-defense.61 Therefore, while the impact from these two discourses on ‘defense’ as a 
shared experience is similar, a more complex question of how researchers go about 
investigating strategic culture is raised. Do different forms of historical nationalism tell us 
different stories about strategic culture? Therefore, strategic culture is useful, but with the 
understanding that culture is a wide research focus and strategic culture is an open topic 
due to historiographical and mnemonic perspectives. 
Memory 
Strategic culture along with the discussion of ‘Europe’ allows for the contemplation 
of memory and narrative. The ‘memory boom’ and advent of history used by societies for 
nation building or rebuilding and regional integration that occurred in the 1990’s is a highly 
relevant context for the narratives being surveyed in the thesis. Reconciling collective 
memory and critically reflecting on the past are seen as keys to European enlargement and 
the future of the EU.62 While the EU only plays a contextual role in this study, the CSCE is 
part of a similar narrative of European integration. Understanding memory is significant in 
considering a new meaning of Europe after ‘collective memory’ was momentarily 
“liberated from constraints imposed by the need for state legitimation and the kind of 
friend-enemy thinking associated with the Cold War.”63 That being said, Małgorzata 
Parkier and Bo Stråth argue that the collective has no memory; it is only a conglomeration 
of individual memories.64 Subsequently, the OSCE has no memory and is only a product of 
the individual conceptions of European security participating states imagined.   
The euphoria that swept the continent in the early 1990’s was associated with 
renewed political will, which attempted to redefine European security structures in 
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collective terms. Many of the support that went along with the memory construction of a 
‘common European home’ was eventual offset by the alternative memory discourse of 
‘back to Europe’. Hence, competing memories of Europe as well as security eclipsed the 
initial memory politics that allowed narratives of the OSCE to momentarily coincide. 
Consequently, “the task of the historian is to contribute not to the construction of a national 
memory but to the deconstruction of the connected repertoire of myths.”65 Thus, an 
understanding of how memory and narrative within the OSCE overlap is significant in 
understanding how the OSCE as a security structure fits into the security identity of the 
various actors discussed in this thesis. 
1.5 Remaining Chapters 
The first section of analytical substance (section 2) will view the conflict within a 
longer historical discourse of a South Caucasian RSC. Section 3 will view the conflict from 
the perspective of the debate over a new Europe. Finally, section 4 will view the conflict 
from the perspective of CSCE/OSCE institutional evolution. By linking some of the 
regional (south Caucasus) and European wide political narrative of the 1990’s with the 
OSCE institutional narrative, it can be seen how ideas of security interact on different 
levels. With specific focus on the OSCE, these levels illuminate how debates shifted 
forums within the CSCE/OSCE, as well as how different forums influenced the 
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2 Regional Security Complex – Openings 
To understand how CSCE/OSCE involvement in the South Caucuses may have 
become securitized, Russia’s historic position as a RSC center is significant. In relation to 
strategic culture, both actors recognize the significance of Russia in the region, as well as 
their need to maintain relatively good relations with their northern neighbor. The idea of 
Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalism and Russia’s role in facilitating the process asserts is 
just one example of Russia as a historic RSC in the region. While the various complexities 
and nuances of nation building in the region cannot be adequately explained here, it is 
beneficial to acknowledge the established argument that Russia is a historic security 
provider in the region and a facilitator of both ethnic communities in their growth into the 
nation-state paradigm.66 With this premise, an analysis of the contemporary period within a 
longer conception of Russia as a RSC center for the South Caucuses can be discussed.  
These premises are also significant when considering strategic cultures in the region 
and how they began to shift towards the end of the Soviet period. The memories of Russia 
as providing stability is significant in observing a few ideas that may influence Armenia’s 
and Azerbaijan’s conception of strategic culture within a communist and imperial narrative. 
Senadin Musabegovic argues that while the communist body politic masked old forms of 
political legitimization, once communism collapsed, the nationalist body reappeared, as it 
had never truly left.67 As such, strategic culture is based upon the legitimacy of a specific 
groups claim to nation-state status, and thus their need to defend this memory of 
legitimization. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia is a critical part of these memories, 
with the communist and nationalist bodies intertwined, influencing how Russia is 
understood as a RSC center.  
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It can be interpreted that Armenian strategic culture is highly dependent on the 
defense of its national body, which lives in the current nation-state container. The idea of 
survival and a securitized Mentalites among ethnic Armenians can be seen as a derivative 
of the national horrors of the Armenian Genocide, the various wars with Azerbaijan, and a 
significant Armenian diaspora around the world. These all compose noteworthy historic 
pieces of Armenian strategic culture and the need for a strong ally such as Russia to 
militarily defend national heritage. 68 Azerbaijan, however, does not have a national 
memory of the Soviets as saviors. Azeri nationalism and unity grew in a different trajectory 
than the Armenians, being often at odds with Soviet nationalist policies because of their 
Muslim heritage and Soviet fear of Iranian influence.69 Consequently, while both the Azeri 
and Armenian national bodies were reawakened after the Soviet collapse, their memories of 
empire, nation, and territory influence the strategic culture they bring to conceptualizing a 
post-Soviet RSC.  
While strategic culture is considered to be persistent, it is also considered 
changeable during windows of opportunity.70 In relation to the NK War, the early 1990’s 
can be considered such a period, with the perceived opportunity for change existing 
throughout Europe. The fluctuating interests for Russian support in the local conflict sent 
signals to the greater European and international community regarding the regions volatile 
security rules. These signals were interpreted in the wider narrative being conceived of a 
‘common European home’ and the subsequent rules and norms based (Helsinki Decalogue) 
security structures that would result. The collapse of Soviet power in the South Caucuses 
influenced the plausibility of the CSCE as a primary conflict management institution. The 
expressed interest in new rules for a South Caucasus RSC led to mediation competition 
between CSCE/OSCE participating states and Russia. The use of international institutions 
such as the CSCE as leverage by Armenia and Azerbaijan in domestic political 
legitimization possibly influenced a narrative in which various OSCE initiatives were 
securitized in the future.    
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2.1 Nagorno-Karabakh War and its Implications 
Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous oblast within the Soviet system. While the 
historical accounts of the region would be too detailed for this summary, the important 
piece to note is that for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the region took on a specific 
significance with regards to the idea of a territorial nation-state identity in the interwar 
years, as well as after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Beginning in 1988, the NK conflict slowly escalated from ethnic violence and 
pogroms in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Increasing violence was a result of boiling tempers 
over the status of NK as an autonomous oblast. The majority ethnic Armenian population 
created local militias, mostly of farmers, called ‘fedayin’ and began supporting their own 
calls for independence. The conflict created chaos in both political systems and exhibited 
Gorbachev’s inability to coherently present the USSR as a regional security provider. The 
USSR declared a state of emergency for the South Caucasus region in January 1990 after 
two years of increasing violence and pogroms. 71 The position of Soviet stability in the 
South Caucasus seemed fragile.  
1991 was a tumultuous year for the Soviet Union and the war in Karabakh. It began 
with the implementation of ‘Operation Ring’ by the Soviet government. In theory, 
Operation Ring was supposed to support both the Armenian and Azerbaijani state organs. 
In reality, it gave the support of the Soviet military in the region to the Azerbaijani 
government. Operation Ring was a passport checking operation so that the Azerbaijani and 
Soviet governments could reassert control over the NK Autonomous Oblast.72 The Soviet 
4th Army ended up participating to suppress Armenian ‘fedayin’ who had become the main 
ethnic Armenian fighting force in the region. A form of partisan war ensued with 
continuous raids on villages and constant trafficking in human captives.73  
In August of 1991 Gorbachev was confronted with a coup attempt by hardliners 
within the communist party and was eventually replaced by Boris Yeltsen. This was a blow 
for Azerbaijan because the local Soviet military units began to take on their own authority; 
many Soviet troops were prisoners at the time and freeing them became a priority over 
orders from Moscow.74 The coup attempt also shifted Soviet focus, speeding up the 
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disintegration of the union by further strengthening calls for national independence, and 
most importantly, left the Azerbaijani forces without the support of the Soviet Army. The 
Armenians had been able to slowly build up their forces through the capture of Soviet 
weapons and armor, while the Azerbaijanis had been largely dependent on Soviet support 
through Operation Ring.75 Armenia declared independence from the USSR in September 
1991 and Azerbaijan followed suite in November. 
 By the end of 1991 and during early 1992, Azerbaijani forces retained one last 
major town in Karabakh - Shusha. This was a strategic point, which if the Azerbaijanis 
could hold, would allow them to either negotiate peace or at least continue to fight. This 
final position of the Azerbaijani forces was paralleled by Iranian initiated peace efforts in 
early 1992. Following the internal turmoil of the August Coup in Russia, the newly born 
Russian Federation had neither the interest nor the strength to produce peace in the South 
Caucuses. That being said, the Iranians also had little success in filling the power vacuum 
the Soviet’s had left. As peace talks proceeded in Tehran and a communiqué on the general 
conditions for a peace agreement was signed between Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan 
(president from 1991-1998) and Azerbaijani leader Yaqub Mamedov, Armenian forces 
attacked Shusha. Unbeknownst to Ter-Petrosyan, De Waal argues that this offensive 
highlighted the duplicity of military commanders that was seen in both countries. The 
potential peace was shattered and Iran ended efforts to mediate; the power vacuum was 
once again opened.76 
Reported form of vigilante justice injected into the partisan war by Soviet troops 
following the August coup was outlined by Michael Mihalka in 1996. His commentary four 
years after the August coup shed light on the implications such actions had on the 
perception of Russian peacekeeping in the international community.77 Because of this, 
international perceptions developed around the idea that Russia may no longer be the main 
security guarantor in the region. Such growing assumptions were also supported by Iran’s 
efforts to mediate and Moscow’s inability to produce peace in 1992, sustaining stability 
through a traditional Soviet RSC. There was uncertainty if the Russian Federation would be 
able to reassert control over the former Soviet RSC at all.  
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1992 continued to be a turbulent year on the ground in NK. In May 1992 The 
Soviets agreed to transfer four divisions that were left in Transcaucasia to the individual 
states, with Armenia receiving one and a half to two of these divisions.78 While on paper it 
seemed that the division of the Soviet remains was even, De Wall comments that firsthand 
accounts revealed a majority of the military agreements were made as a result of “‘money, 
personal contacts and lots of vodka.’”79 This again supported the perception of a mercenary 
characteristic in the escalating conflict, leading to allegations of Russians driving heavy 
armor for the Azerbaijani’s in their summer 1992 offensive and subsequently the 
Armenian’s convincing the Soviet Air Force to step in and stop the offensive.80 Russian 
forces not only allegedly played a role in escalating the fighting from a partisan conflict to a 
‘normal’ war, but the earlier arms transfer agreement neglected any maintenance or 
replacement parts. Therefore Phillip Peterson argues that the use of heavy weaponry by 
both sides was continually dependent on the Russian Federation.81 While Russia may have 
lost the political power to influence the conflict in 1991, their material capabilities, though 
purportedly a mercenary force in 1992, had the ability to sustain influence over the political 
process for the coming years. Political elites from both nations understood that the support 
of the Russian military was needed for any decisive territorial victory. Neither wanted to 
accept the implications these alliances would have in the long term on sovereignty, strategic 
culture, or reconceptualization of a South Caucasus RSC  
Abulfaz Elchibey, a former Azerbaijani dissident, won the Azeri presidency in June 
1992, bringing the Azeri Popular Front of Azerbaijan movement (PFA) to power. The PFA 
was a contradiction in terms. They were for the retention of NK and the sanctity of what 
they perceived as the ‘authentic’ Azerbaijani homeland, but neglected to recognize that this 
was not possible without Russian arms. The fact that Azerbaijan was much more likely to 
publicly speak out against Russian involvement in the region, while also dependent on 
Russia to confront the Armenian ‘fedayin’, turned out to be a significant problem for the 
PFA. Like Armenia, the form of nationalism that came to legitimize new politicians such as 
Elchibey began the trend where NK was the primary key to internal political stability, 
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consequently tying domestic political power to any RSC center.82 Therefore, it was 
beneficial for Azerbaijani to support a RSC center aside from Russia because a Russian 
RSC would mean limited sovereignty. 
After the high mark of the Azerbaijani offensive ended in October 1992, Armenia 
was poised to make a counter offensive the next year. March 1993 marked the beginning of 
a divergence within the Armenian leadership between those who wanted a diplomatic 
solution, and those that wants to resolve the issue militarily. In De Wall’s account, 
President Ter-Petrosyan is characterized as continually looking for a diplomatic solution to 
the conflict, while only being partially informed by his military commanders of the 
complicity the Armenian military was to have in the spring offensive. Up until this point in 
the conflict, the Armenian military only supported the ethnic Armenian ‘fedayin’ secretly. 
The 1993 spring offensive largely succeeded and the relative easy of the Armenian 
operation motivated Moscow to put pressure on the new Azerbaijani government to accept 
peace as well as a Russian peacekeeping force.83 The apparent presence of the Armenian 
military in the operation, as opposed to simply ‘fedayin’ fighters, along with allegations of 
participation from Russian 7th Army soldiers, led to the first official condemnation of the 
conflict by the United Nations on April 30th.84 Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan worked to 
salvage his position by supporting a Russian-Armenian-Turkish peace plan. He gained an 
agreement from NK leaders in June of ’93 in exchange for a concession that the agreement 
would only be implemented a month later, which turned out to be a politically 
advantageous concession. After the Armenian offensive the Azerbaijani PFA regime of 
Elchibey began to deteriorate and all peace agreements became void.  
Though Elchibey gained his legitimacy through Azerbaijani military gains in ’92, 
his young presidency was not able to reign in all its military commanders. Similar to the 
allegations of De Waal and Mihalka that Russian military commanders who took advantage 
of a faltering chain of command to gain their own wealth, the Azeri states monopoly on 
violence seemed to be progressing in the same direction. Commander Surat Husseinov was 
a leading figure in this regard and a growing political opponent of Elchibey following Azeri 
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military defeats in NK. Elchibey did not have the resources to take on Husseinov, who was 
allegedly prepared to use women and children as human shields as well as weapons left by 
the Russian 104th Airborne division to march on Baku.85 Elchibey looked for political 
options, eventually inviting former Azerbaijani KGB general and First Secretary of the 
Communist party of Azerbaijan, Haydar Aliev, to support the ailing government. Within 
four months, Aliev worked his way through parliament to direct a national referendum and 
a vote of no confidence on Elchibey, leading Aliev to the Presidency. This confrontation 
preoccupied Azerbaijan security forces with internal power struggles, allowing Armenian 
forces to take five regions of Azerbaijan or 20 present of Azerbaijan in four months.86  
Vladimir Kazimirov, Russian Special Envoy for the NK conflict, produced a 
temporary cease-fire between August-September of 1993 while Azerbaijan was undergoing 
internal political chaos.87 With Aliev elected in October of 1993, he began a duel strategy of 
negotiations with NK directly on the one hand and mass conscription of Azerbaijani youth 
after disbanding all units loyal to PFA on the other. Aliev had a clear political vision for his 
survival, which included warming relations with Moscow; prior to taking over the 
presidency, he signed a CIS accession agreement in September of ’93. Fitting enough, 
Aliev began negotiations with Karabakh leader Robert Kocharian in Moscow at the Russian 
Foreign Minister’s mansion. This produced a dialog that Vladimir Kazimirov had 
attempted to formulate on numerous occasions. The time for negotiation seemed to be 
ripening in line with mounting international consideration, seeing as the UN produced four 
Security Council resolutions by the end of 1993. One such resolution from October noted 
Armenian direct participation in the escalation of violence and urged the Armenian 
Government to “exert their influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh.”88 With international perceptions appearing to favor Azerbaijan, the former 
KGB general was prepared to play his hand.  
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Following the third UN Security Council resolution, Azerbaijan launches a new 
offensive in October, ten day after Aliev was formally elected president. The fragile 
ceasefire broke and NK Armenians expanded their area of control to the south. Two months 
later, the final portion of the war broke out, being fought mainly between the armies of 
Azerbaijan and Armenia.89  This period of the war would not end until May 1994, with no 
peace agreement being formally signed 
2.2 RSC Considerations 
Newly found independence and Nagorno-Karabakh as a new legitimizing myth of 
nation gave opportunities for both Armenia and Azerbaijan to validate concerns they had 
about Russia as a mediator and security provider. It also offered a period of violent 
reflection on Russia’s meaning for their respective, shifting, strategic cultures.  Top 
officials from both Armenian and Azerbaijan agreed that “Russian troops should not 
assume the role of peacekeeping forces in Transcaucasia.”90 But while there was concern 
about the traditional security dynamic, both governments understood what a RSC center 
meant for individual sovereignty as well as the status of NK. As 1992 was a period of 
shifting legitimacy and consolidation in Azerbaijani and Armenia, the priority of internal 
political consolidation seemed more important than regional stability. Thus, the long 
narrative of ‘no war no peace’ and the power NK came to hold over internal politics in both 
countries evolved out of the advent of ‘shopping around’. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia 
looked for a mediation form, and hence security provider, that offered the greatest room for 
internal maneuver among domestic political elites.91  
In a set of 1992 interviews, the Armenia Deputy Foreign Minister Karine Kazinian 
mitigated the previous comments that Russian should not produce a PKO in the region by 
saying “to be frank, the UN is also not enough. Without Russian participation in the region, 
no solution is possible. Furthermore… excluding Russia from any solution only makes it 
suspicious and aggravates Russia.”92  With Armenia under a blockade from Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, heavily influencing the accessibility of basic resources such as electricity, Armenia 
understood that Russia was its only lifeline. While this materialized in support of Russian 
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resolutions in the CSCE and Minsk Group, interest in sustaining newly found sovereignty 
was also apparent.  
Russian sway was suspected in the internal discontinuity between Armenian 
President Ter-Petrosyan and his military commanders. In his efforts to create regional 
stability, Ter-Petrosyan was contradicted multiple times by both the Armenian military and 
the leaders of NK. The offensive during the Iranian negotiations in early 1992 was one 
example and the extensive offensive in 1993 would be another. Though it cannot be said 
that Russia was constantly supporting Armenia, Armenian commanders possessed a sense 
of impunity that was not cultivated independently. For some analysts, this was considered 
the product of Russian military interest in seeing Armenian success in NK, causing 
increased pressure on Azerbaijan’s PFA government to accept a Russian PKO.93 Ter-
Petrosyan understood that if domestic political consolidation was to be made, a resolution 
to the NK conflict would have to come first. Though Ter-Petrosyan made constant efforts 
to produce a durable peace, the questions of war in Karabakh began to emerge as the 
primary frame of Armenian domestic politics and possibly strategic culture. It seemed that 
the success of military actions worked to congeal the superiority of military resolutions to 
the conflict, as well as the necessity of Russia as a RSC center.  
The fundamental necessity of Russia as a security guarantor and domestic political 
legitimizer was opposed, but simultaneously validated, by Azari officials. Speaker of Azri 
Parliament, Isa Kanberov, in 1992 commented “‘our most important security objective is to 
liquidate the old colonial system and develop democratic values…while we work to 
eliminate the former colonel system, we must continue to take into consideration the 
interests of the Russian Federation.’”94 Head of the International Organization department 
in the Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs Araz Beyukaga oglu Azimov also complicated this 
vision of coexistence by claiming “at this point in history, ‘decentralized power is stronger 
than centralized power.’…[and] ‘the three countries could satisfy their mutual security 
requirements without Russia.95 While these comments may have been more emotional then 
based in reality, they present an image for the type of narrative Azerbaijan wanted to write. 
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While Azerbaijan had a troubled relationship with Russia due to ethnic and religious 
issues, it was in a position to gain support from other neighbors such as Turkey.96 These 
relations led Azerbaijan to have loose considerations of Turkey as a security guarantor 
under the NATO umbrella.97  The tension between Azerbaijan and Russia was also 
enflamed by Azeri officials such as speaker of Parliament Isa Kanberov, again asserting the 
need for alternative RSC centers. “Many people think that with the end of the Warsaw Pact 
the burden of NATO declined, but I disagree. Now the responsibility of maintaining peace 
and stability in Europe belongs exclusively with NATO.”98 The conflict continued to be 
exploited to solidify Azeri national autonomy from Russia. It also allowed Azerbaijan to 
capitalize on exhibiting its preference of leaving a Russian centered RSC, even though their 
survival, ability to take back NK, and legitimize domestic political power still largely 
depended on Russian force.  
As discussed above, the shifting internal politics, war, and potential for a new 
security arrangement show a shift, if only momentary, in strategic culture. The question of 
Russia as a RSC was ever-present throughout the NK conflict and set the stage for OSCE 
conflict management interest. The CSCE was able to make large steps in regards to conflict 
management during 1992 and will be further discussed in the next chapter. Due to the 
incomplete nature of CSCE institutional construction, it allowed for the countries within the 
Transcaucasia RSC to exacerbate the rivalry between Russia and other CSCE participating 











                                                          
96 Demirtepe and Laciner 2004, 443. 
97 Peterson 1994, 51. 
98 Ibid., 55. 
 Reynolds 33 
 
3 Mediation Competition 
“Yet everyone was aware that without a firm commitment from the CSCE to provide a 
force promptly no agreement was possible, because the parties knew a ceasefire would not 
last unless outsiders were present to supervise it.” 
John J. Maresca 199699 
With regard to the commitments of small states, the next two chapters will flesh out   
Nünlist’s assertions presented in the introduction. This chapter refocuses on the historic 
moment of 1990-1994. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CSCE/OSCE 
during these four years was aptly described “as the sole pan-European structure, [which] 
had the important task of managing the changes that followed that epochal event.”100 This 
moment of high, but fluctuating political will and ambition in the European community 
signaled a period when small states were able to achieve further gains in regards to an 
institutionalized security vision of a collective Europe, similar to the Helsinki Process 
1973-1975 and Stockholm 1983-1985.101 This assertion will be presented through the 
narrative of a right to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the subsequent PKO 
debates. Small states such as Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Finland took 
substantial roles in this process. Before the gap began to close in 1995, additional small 
states who were fundamental throughout the CSCE process, such as Switzerland, Romania, 
Poland, etc. continued to support these goals.102 These actors worked against the 
disengagement or pro-NATO policy of the US and the uncertain foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation. This period was also the opening of a ‘back to Europe’ rhetoric setting 
the stage for the future clash with the ‘common European home’ ideology.  
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This entrance of ‘back to Europe’ can be seen as an attempt to influence the 
memory politics that opened after the collapse of communism. It also impacted Russia’s 
hope that a ‘common European home’ collective memory might absolve it of difficult 
reconciliation after the collapse of empire. Former WP states in turn looked to associate 
with European structures, neglecting deep reconciliation, as they had always been a part of 
‘Europe’, albeit with a half century of occupation.  These memories are influential factors 
in narrative construction within the CSCE, as well as actors’ perception of the CSCE as a 
sufficient holder and legitimizer of said narrative in relation to security during the 1990’s. 
3.1 CSCE Memories 
The CSCE’s growth out of the post-WWII environment along with the hopes and 
aspirations of individual states in 1990 painted a picture of independent actors, albeit at times 
restrained by the lethargy of history or memory of strategic culture. Within this longer historical 
recollection, it is significant to present the individual memory and interpretation different 
actors associate with the CSCE. John Freeman, a British diplomat, noted prior to 1990 that: 
The NNA [N+N] group was more ambitious than either of the two military 
alliances. As individual delegations and also as a group they showed themselves 
anxious to make progress on military aspects of security. It is perhaps too easy to 
overlook the fact that unlike the military alliances the opportunities for the neutral 
and non-aligned states to influence negotiated security outcomes was very limited. 
But their national security was usually very much influenced by, if not actually 
dependent upon East-West ‘conflict’. The level of military forces – and their 
sometimes nuclear character- directly impinged upon their sense or absence of 
security…  The NNA were to play an important role in discussions of security at all 
relevant CSCE meetings.103   
This presentation of the N+N states and other individualistic actors, gives a special 
character to and memory of the CSCE that may not always be present in traditional 
accounts of the Cold War. As presented in the introduction, other actors such as Maresca 
may have considered themselves acting out great power politics. Maresca sums up his bias 
with the comment that “the key issues in multilateral negotiations are always destined to be 
negotiated by great powers, and any resulting agreements are destined to be hammered out 
between them.”104 He presented this opinion in relation to Kissinger’s ability to negotiate 
the peaceful changes of frontiers, which would eventually allow for the reunification and 
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NATO membership of East Germany, as well as further human rights concessions by the 
USSR. While from a particular reading of history he is not wrong, as this thesis will argue, 
the viewpoint discounts the efforts of small actors and the ability they have in creating an 
environment where agreements can be made.  The parallel interpretation of the past is 
presented by Thomas Fisher, who states that the CSCE was 
the only moment in European Cold War history when neutral and non-aligned states 
played a decisive role in multilateral diplomacy. 
… 
The European security conference provided these states with a unique opportunity 
to activate their foreign policy in a multilateral context and to improve their 
international standing, and with their participation in the CSCE, the neutrals and 
non-aligned states changed their position definitively from object to subject in 
European Cold War affairs.105 
The dichotomy presented by these interpretations is palpable and highly parallel to the 
study being laid out here. While both Maresca and Freeman experienced the CSCE first 
hand as actors, they selectively remember different aspects of the conference as paramount 
to its significance. They write their actions into different narratives, and thus influence the 
story they choose to write for the future. This microcosm can also be seen in the activeness 
different states took during the 1990’s in response to their previous success in the 
organization and how it coincides with said actor’s strategic culture.  
While 1990 is not the start point for diverging historic memories, it is a point of 
conceptualization of potential European politics outside the block to block paradigm. The 
1990’s offered an opening for a greater realization of independent narrative construction 
aided by the ‘memory boom’. The ability to influence memory politics for the new image 
of nation springing out of the communist collapse was also being grasped. The account of 
Nagorno-Karabakh mediation will be analyzed with this longer temporal frame in mind, 
looking back on CSCE experiences to consider how the organization fits into individual 
states’ strategic culture as well as perceptions of the future as a derivative of narrative and 
memory.  
3.2 Towards a Collective Memory?  
 The Charter of Paris, signed in November 1990, was a formidable moment in the 
CSCE’s evolution and post-Cold War history. It was an initial step in constructing a new 
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collective security memory insomuch as it presented a seemingly uncontroversial vision of 
the future. Commentators at the time noted, “those who seek in the Charter of Paris a 
blueprint for a new political order in Europe will be disappointed. The most significant 
accomplishments are clearly the commitments to democracy and the rule of law.”106 On the 
contrary, the reunification of Germany earlier that year, as well as new agreements on a 
common interpretation of respect for human rights and the rule of law showed strides 
toward a collective memory due the enmity these issues caused over the past half century.  
In line with these debates and Gorbachev’s position of showing Europe that the 
Soviets were a “civilized European nation,”107 the USSR offered to host the CSCE Human 
Dimension meeting in Moscow during 1991. The concluding document of this meeting 
stated that human rights could no longer be denied by the principle of ‘non-intervention in 
internal affairs’.108 This reinterpretation of the Helsinki Decalogue principle of ‘none 
interference in internal affairs’ first in relation to human rights and later in relation to the 
political-military dimension, became the foundation for a new definition of Europe.109 This 
was a vital renegotiation of the Helsinki Decalogue and a potential sign for a common 
European narrative. That being said, these agreements also became a point of ideological 
opposition in a post-Gorbachev Russian narrative. This exhibits that by neglecting to 
acknowledge that Soviet memory was not in line with Western memory, a new collective 
memory based on Western perceptions was no basis for future attunement.  
As the traditional vision of the CSCE was in euphoric crisis, it seemed that some 
actors wanted to forget the negative aspects of original block politics, but retain the position 
of power associated with such a system. Thus, the predictability of negotiating positions 
that went along with more stable identity and memory politics disappeared. The US pushed 
for continued progress on CBMs with a new Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE), 
attempting to use arms control to safeguard stability at a time of tumultuous political 
change.110 Europeans hoped that “only a CSCE with a renewed agenda and with a solid 
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structural base [could] serve as an effective instrument for the ‘reunification’ of Europe.”111 
Some commentators within the soon to be independent Russia saw the CSCE as their last 
chance to remain within a European framework. This caused the basis for growing political 
infighting within the Russia elite, partially due to Gorbachev’s ‘radicalism’, in response to 
the belief that they had been cheated out of Germany and other areas a Russian sphere of 
influence was entitled to.112 The Helsinki principles were originally written with double 
meaning to accommodate a variety of narratives and ideas of Europe. When formal 
agreements began to drift toward the Western interpretation after 1991, specifically the idea 
of human rights and the abdication of sanctity of internal affairs, only part of Russia was in 
agreement. While a perceived common narrative was part of the euphoria of the early 
1990’s, new forums for interaction would prove otherwise. 
 Within this context of memory, narrative, and new European security architecture, 
there was the fundamental question of what responsibility the CSCE had in regards to 
emerging post-Soviet conflicts. As the only regional organization including all nation states 
from the European continent and post-Soviet space (after January 1992), the CSCE was a 
logical choice for common action. The 1990-1991 period also lent itself to the CSCE as a 
forum for embodying new hopes, pushing small states to support such visions as the CSCE 
had come to align with their strategic cultures.  
3.3 The Meaning of New European Security in Practice 
 The initial effects of these new narratives on the Nagorno-Karabakh mediation 
discourse took shape in 1992 when all former Soviet republics were admitted to the CSCE 
and various conflicts broke out in the former Soviet Space. The first mention of the CSCE 
taking on a harder role in conflict management in a formal text was at the second CSCE 
Senior Council in Prague, January 1992. The concluding document briefly mentioned that 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting to be held later that year should “give careful consideration 
to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in peacekeeping.”113 Internally, the 
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idea of a CSCE PKO was being discussed and supported by various Nordic countries, 
Canada, and some Central and Eastern European members.114 Following Iran’s attempts in 
February to mediate the NK conflict, the CSCE began planning the opening of a peace 
conference in Minsk the next month, organized by the Minsk Group.115 Established in 1992, 
the Minsk Group was as a preparatory conference for negotiations on the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and was eventually given a formal mandate at the 1994 Budapest 
Summit. This hybrid conference planning organ and political medium became the OSCE’s 
main forum for facilitating dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The efforts of 
Tehran to mediate the growing conflict worried both Russia and the CSCE, focusing 
international attention on the region as well as on the CSCE PKO debate.116  
De Wall interprets this historic moment, when the CSCE decided to explore 
mediation options regarding NK, selectively, quoting Maresca’s mnemonic documentation: 
It began, in the words of one of those present, ‘almost as an afterthought’ at the end 
of a meeting in Prague on 31 January 1992, at which most of the former Soviet 
republics were admitted to the organization. As the meeting was winding up. The 
British delegate pointed out that the organization had just admitted two members, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, who were at war with each other and that the CSCE was 
obliged to do something about it. A CSCE fact-finding mission was dispatched to 
the region.117 
While this is a direct quote from an earlier account by Maresca, De Wall takes it out of 
context and disregards the qualifying interpretation Maresca offers. In Maresca’s original 
account, in the same paragraph where De Wall gains the above information, Maresca went 
on to mention that: 
By the time the warring sides and the issues which separated them had been largely 
defined. The challenge for the international community was thus neither one of 
foreseeing the conflict nor of preventing it from becoming violent. From the outset 
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of its involvement, the problems which the international community faced were 
those of conflict resolution and reconciliation.118 
This second part of the quote is pivotal in understanding how the international community 
approached the NK conflict. The initiations at Prague were in preparation for higher level 
CSCE meetings later that year where more substantial mandates could be considered. The 
context of Prague was that of a meeting tasked with preparing institutional options to be 
explored prior to the Helsinki Summit in July 1992, as well as the Ministerial Council in 
Stockholm, December 1992. Therefore, Prague ’92 was less of an ‘afterthought’ and more 
of a preparatory measure for one of the OSCE’s longest institutional commitments.  
Additionally, Maresca goes further to contextualize the CSCE decision in a form of 
practical knowledge and memory, saying that very few Western countries had any 
diplomats with knowledge of former Soviet Union Republics. Even the Russian Foreign 
Ministry was largely uninformed of the history and politics that developed within its own 
borders during the time of the Soviet Union.119 Thus, from Maresca’s account, the fact that 
most participating states were largely uninformed about Nagorno-Karabakh and that the 
CSCE inherited a variety of new conflicts with the accession of the former Soviet Union 
Republics, NK may not have seemed like a necessary issue to address in preventing war. 
Though the account De Wall presents is one of the most comprehensive on the NK conflict 
itself, his interpretation of the mediation aspects seems to be read through the lens of the 
regional conflict, rather than the lens of a jubilant post-Cold War Europe. In adding this 
contextual caveat, it can also be interpreted that most state level actors were yet to fully 
understand Armenia and Azerbaijan outside the context of the ‘communist body’ 
mentioned in chapter one. As the new national body was not understood, shifting strategic 
cultures in the region weren’t either. This set the initial frame for how CSCE initiatives 
entered a South Caucasian RSC, where many of the variables were continually shifting. 
Whereas the diplomatic aesthetics of Prague may have been considered an 
afterthought, the CSCE’s actions that followed were much less so. Within twelve days of 
the Prague Meeting of Senior Officials, the CSCE fielded a fact-finding mission to Armenia 
and Azerbaijan to confirm their “admission” status to the CSCE, but also to assess the 
situation in NK. This mission, produced by the Czechoslovak CiO and led by Czechoslovak 
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Ambassador Karel Schwarzenberg, was the first CSCE mission with a quota of military 
offices.120 Following the Helsinki II mandate in July ’92, the idea of military involvement in 
CSCE missions gained an official status with the PKO mandate. Later that year, the Initial 
Operation Planning Group (IOPG) and predecessor to the HLPG, was formed to consider 
how the Helsinki II mandate could be applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.121 The 
initiative of the IOPG was led by Swedish Major-General Bergh. He prepared the stage for 
continued direction by Sweden in 1993-1994 and setting the tone for small state leadership 
in CSCE mediation of NK.122 Thus the afterthought of Prague set in motion an institutional 
evolution and mandate that was closely tied to NK.  
The leadership of Czechoslovakia at this juncture in the CSCE evolution is 
significant in contemplating strategic culture. Though Czechoslovakia took the CSCE 
chairmanship in 1993 and hosted the first CSCE secretariat before it was moved to its 
permanent home in Vienna, the Velvet Divorce and other factors would cause the strategic 
culture of the new nation to grapple with the emerging memory of communism. Jan Jires, 
for example, describes Czech strategic culture as highly supportive of international 
peacekeeping, conflict management, and out of region involvement – all visions of a young 
CSCE. But in his analysis of Czech security documents, Jires clearly shows these goals as a 
means for achieving the image of “a responsible member of the Western security 
community.”123 While there are mentions of various different foreign policy schools within 
Czech politics, they all align with this internationalist view, which contemporary analysts 
see as validated through NATO and EU membership.124 The CSCE discourse presented 
here further colors said goals as a form of post-Soviet security-identity formation achieved 
through the CSCE. After the 1990 CSCE Paris document, where no grand strategy 
appeared, but rather only idealist hopes, a future security community with Russia without 
legal or material guaranties of safety may have conjured up negative memories of the 
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communist past. As stated by Klas-göran Karlasson, “an existential use of history is 
triggered by the need to remember, or alternatively to forget, in order to uphold or intensify 
feelings of orientation and identity in a society characterized by insecurity, pressure or 
sudden change.”125 The increasing rhetoric of ‘back to Europe’, which embodied Vaclav 
Havel and the Civic Forum movement in 1990 Czechoslovak elections, formed into a social 
and security memory that provided a incantation of the Europe Czechoslovakia had once 
been a part of prior to the WP. Though Czechia would be the CSCE chairman after the 
Velvet Divorce in 1993, troop contributions to NATO began in 1995 with membership in 
1999.126 Collective security was also a term loaded with memory. For collective security to 
mean security with Russia, Czechia would have to assess its communist past and events 
such as the WP invasion in 1968. It seems that the alternative was chosen and a ‘common 
European home’ could not be synonymous with security if Russia was a member.  
Swedish leadership on the other hand, fits into a longer narrative of achieving 
strategic aims through the CSCE. Swedish identity has been closely tied with neutrality 
throughout history, but the meaning of which has changed depending on society, elites, and 
historical context. According to Chiara Ruffa the underlying self-image of Sweden as a 
force for good in the world remained constant, pushing the nation to support international 
peacekeeping operations and a preference for non-use of force. An early example of this in 
the CSCE process was when the Swedish delegation, at the 1973-75 Geneva planning 
meetings, pushed for the norm of transparency, requesting disclosure of all member states 
military budgets. Though this died due to Soviet opposition, disclosure of military budgets 
is a key CBM today. 127 Sweden also hosted the 1984-86 Stockholm Disarmament 
Conference. This validated the CSCE process as an arms control forum where all 
participating states had a voice, rather than the bilateral arms negotiations the US preferred. 
 In the immediate post-Cold War period, in a shifting moment, Swedish strategic 
culture seemed to be drifting towards support for a multilateral, norms based European 
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order, where there would be the opportunity “to change the world to fit Swedish ideals.” 128 
The commitment of Sweden to new CSCE missions and the possibility of a CSCE PKO 
reflected this vision in the 1990’s. Sweden too, one of the staunchest supporters of the 
CSCE, became enticed by NATO cooperation. In policy documents Sweden named the UN 
as the primary international arena for PKO support and as early as 2002 defined NATO as 
the true provider of European Security.129 Though Sweden clearly drifted away from the 
early commitments of the CSCE as a way of effectively shaping the world in the image of 
Swedish ideals, the commitments remain today. “The Law on Armed Forces for Service 
Abroad” allows Sweden to deploy up to 3,000 peacekeepers internationally, specifically 
mentioning UN and OSCE PKO missions, without the approval of parliament.130 While this 
does not allow peace enforcement operations (use of force), it clearly retains the spirit of 
the CSCE/OSCE PKO debate outlined here. 
3.4 Concrete Steps 
Following the March 1992 initiatives and the founding of the Minsk Group, Italy as 
the first Minsk Group chair organized emergency meetings in Rome. Known as the Villa 
Madama meetings, these talks which began in the summer of 1992, offered an alternative to 
the existing Russian mediation.131 These efforts were an attempt to facilitate mediation with 
the political networks of the CSCE, while simultaneously endeavoring to present a forum 
with limited institutional political interests.132 The idea to hold a separate Minsk Conference 
was a way to produce a mediation track facilitated by the CSCE, though still independent 
from the organization.133   
In these Rome preliminary meetings, Russian presented an interest in retaining a 
principal conflict mediation position. The Russia Federation was concerned with hard 
military measures as well as exclusive rights to managing and mediating a ceasefire. This 
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sentiment was supported in a joint Russian/Armenian draft proposal from 18 June 1992.134 
Azerbaijan countered with an alternative proposal, requesting that the UN or CSCE 
administer any potential “peace-making” force.135 In doing so, Azerbaijan asserted its new 
independent foreign policy and further opening the door for and alternative security 
arrangement in the region. Both the Russian interest and the idea of peace-making can be 
seen in opposition to the Swedish strategic values of non-use of force. This was significant 
as Sweden began to actively take on leadership of its own in the NK mediation framework. 
While still early in the 1990’s, these debates, along with journalistic accounts of ongoing 
Russian peacekeeping efforts in the post-Soviet space, formed a foundation for future 
assertions that Russian peacekeeping was not palatable for a new, value based Europe. An 
evolving CSCE PKO also became a symbol for wider OSCE involvement, and hence, a 
deeper securitization of values by Russia.136 As an immediate response to the concern of all 
parties, the decision was made to recommend Mr. Heikki Juhani Happonen of Finland as 
the head of a CSCE Advanced Monitoring Group.137  
It is visible from the recorded statements at the 1992 Rome preliminary meetings 
that the initial issue in the conflict resolution process stemmed from who would maintain 
peace within the post-Soviet space in the new emerging international order. Russia showed 
that due to internal consternation over the past three years, it had not been unable to quell 
the partisan violence and maintain stability in the region. This led Russia to seek other 
forums for reasserting regional security, such as backing from the UN or CSCE, but only in 
terms of financial support and additional troops that Russia could command. With the 
donation of staff and effort to facilitate international mediation networks from states such 
as Sweden, Finland, and Czechoslovakia, the CSCE’s voice was amplified, so as to support 
any say the bourgeoning institution might have in the peace process.  
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The position of Finland as a bridge in conflict resolution was a position they readily 
played throughout the CSCE process. Examples include Finnish Ambassador Ralph 
Enckell, who effectively navigated Russia’s interest in having Finland propose and 
organize an all European security conference in the 1960’s. For Fisher, Enckell effectively 
spread the gospel of a CSCE while feigning to promote the conference on Moscow’s terms, 
simultaneously fortifying Finland’s neutrality as an “indispensable precondition to the 
conference.”138 The image grew when the presidents of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the German Democratic Republic shook hands for the first time at Dipoli Conference 
Hall in Espoo, Finland. This created a significant image of Finland as an actor who could 
facilitate progress on issues such as the German question, which was one of the largest 
sources of enmity in Cold War Europe.139 In the words of Finnish diplomat Jaakko Iloniemi, 
“the mere initiative was in itself a strong political signal of Finland’s will and ability to 
operate constructively in the European field of tensions.”140  
This identity as a bridge can also be understood as a form of leadership in sustaining 
the CSCE and creating room for other actors. One small proposal by the Finns on follow-up 
meetings after the initial 1973-1975 period of negotiations was agreed upon in 1975, 
achieving commitments for a continuation of the CSCE process.141 Hungary and Romania 
were strong supporters of the Finns proposal for follow-up meetings, even though Moscow 
and Washington were strongly against the CSCE continuing past a 1975 summit.142 These 
follow-up meetings came to define the CSCE process. In Stockholm 1984-1986 at the final 
CSCE disarmament negotiation conference of the Cold War, which the Soviets had been 
asking for since 1977, the perennial issue of negotiations on exchange of military 
information came to a standstill as it had in Geneva ‘74.  Only after efforts from the Finnish 
ambassador was the gap bridged, first by obtaining a tacit acceptance of ambiguous 
wording on the exchange of military information to get the parties to a final document.143  
The narrative Finland wrote in regards to the CSCE was a narrative of empowerment. New 
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responsibilities undertaken in regard to the NK conflict can be understood as part of a 
longer conceptualization of the image and security Finland wanted to achieve. 
The position Finland took up in the early stages of CSCE proposals for mediation of 
the NK conflict, similar to Sweden, also reflected a longer idea of strategic culture. Finland, 
more than Sweden considered the CSCE as a critical component of its identity as Finland 
gained substantially in international and self-image with the successful Final Act in 1975 
(which, many thought would never happen). While Sweden looked to influence a value-
based order, Antti Seppo and Tuomas Forsberg argue the old Kekkonen mantra still 
prevails in Finland. That being Finland should be a physician rather than a judge in 
international conflicts. Yet while Finland has a strategic commitment to détente and a rules 
based European security architecture, after 1975 “the national reading of the CSCE 
developed, again, more towards the latter at the cost of the former.”144 Both readings can be 
seen in the 1990’s, but the unfolding of this dichotomy is also present in Finnish leadership 
of OSCE mediation of the NK conflict. Irrespective, the CSCE/OSCE remained in line with 
idealist aspects of Finnish strategic culture, allowing for the assumption of a “self-image as 
a country that is active in and capable of peacekeeping and peace-mediating.”145 This self-
image, pursued through the CSCE process, also interacted with Kari Möttölä’s 
argumentation that “Russia has a role in the Finnish narrative, not only as a great-power 
neighbor, but also as a key factor in the unification or division of Europe at large.”146  In 
sum, Finnish commitment to the CSCE remained throughout the period of analysis and 
beyond, as the need for compromise and discussion has often been referred to as the need to 
invoke the spirit of Helsinki.  
3.5 Russia’s Shifting Strategic Culture and the CSCE 
The debate over what role the CSCE should take continued to play out, with the 
various camps established in 1991 preparing for the Helsinki Summit of 1992, or Helsinki 
II. Lehne describes the two main visions of the CSCE during this period as composed of 
those who were in favor of more security dialogue within the Conflict Prevention Center 
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(CPC- chapter three) and those who favored more arms control measures and a wider 
institutional identity.147 As most emerging conflicts were in the post-Soviet space, relations 
with Russia became a pivotal point of defining any CSCE conflict mediation role. While 
not wanting to leave Russia on the periphery of post-Cold War politics, CSCE participating 
states still held “uncertainty about how to handle Russia’s interests in the CIS.”148 Russia 
remained the primary security guarantor in the post-Soviet space, even as the Soviet RSC 
deteriorated and other states such as Iran momentarily attempted to fill the void.  
In terms of Russian strategic culture, it was unclear how a new Russia would define 
security and if old imperial notions of identity would remain. While many Western leaders 
saw Gorbachev’s initiatives and commitments to a revised Helsinki Decalogue as an 
opportunity to create a common European definition of security, internal issues within 
Russia came to dictate otherwise. Liz Fuller argues that an alteration occurred during the 
course of 1992 in Russian, military-security politics, shifting from an Atlanticist 
perspective to Eurasian Realism. This shift allegedly placed greater importance on Turkey 
and Iran rather than Europe. Fuller outlines domestic discourse in Russia to elucidate this 
point, showing that the fear of a Caucasus without Russia would lead to Turkey as a 
regional super power comparable to Russia.149 This fear exhibits that even after the Soviet 
collapse, the post-Soviet space, or at least the Caucasus as a Russian security complex was 
still seen as a significant part of Russian identity and memory, materializing in popular 
media and official documents. 
Such a growing fear was contextualized with the founding of the Collective Security 
Treaty in Tashkent, May 1992. This produced a debate of how to define the former Soviet 
Transcaucasus Military District. With some talk of relinquishing Russian oversight under 
the guise of the CIS, Colonel-General Valerii Patrikeev temporarily settled the matter in an 
interview with TASS, commenting that Russian jurisdiction would remain. In March, the 
Russian parliament requested Armenia and Georgia enter talks to define the status of 
Russian troops on their territory, followed by new recommendations from Russia that they 
should construct a new collective security structure in the region. Roy Allison contends that 
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these regional developments were partially driven by a personal interest on the part of the 
armed forces to define the South Caucasus and Black Sea Coast as fundamental to Russian 
Security.  A caucus of military officials developed in the early 1990’s with the goal of 
securing Russian interests in the ‘near-abroad’.150 These developments in internal Russian 
security discussions contradicted many of Gorbachev’s initiatives. They also exhibited the 
fragile nature of Russian security identity, the uncertainty of the shift from a Soviet to 
Russian strategic culture, and if there would be any real shift at all. 
 Confusion of how to consider a new Russian state and what role the CSCE should 
play in conflict management were influential issues for the evolving PKO debate. Further 
considered at Helsinki in July of 1992 following the Azeri offensive, Helsinki II expanded 
the language on peacekeeping and was the initial mandate for all future peacekeeping 
debates. This mandate also made reference to gaining support from a third party or other 
international institutions for PKOs. In this section of the document, there is a subtle 
differentiation between Western European institutions facilitating PKOs as entire entities 
and cooperation with “peacekeeping mechanisms of the CIS.”151 The perspective on the 
ground looked gruesome and Russia’s role either as a restraining force or a party to the 
conflict remained unclear. 1992 signified an interest in the CSCE to take further 
institutional steps in securing peace in the CSCE area, as well as signal to a new Russia that 
the CSCE may have an interest in either providing or supporting security in a traditionally 
Russian RSC. The mention of the CIS for its tools rather than its institutional integrity may 
have been a hint at the growing command and control structure disagreement in the PKO 
debate. Nonetheless, the partial reference to the CIS was an ominous sign for what future 
CSCE intervention in a Russian RSC might mean for Russian leadership, prestige, and 
securitization. 
 The December Ministerial Council in Stockholm to end 1992 reaffirmed the 
Helsinki II mandate and set the stage for Sweden’s chairmanship of the CSCE in 1993. 
OSCE ministers affirmed their most prominent definition of peacekeeping to date, stating 
“in association with efforts to bring about political solutions, stability can be enhanced by 
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armed contingents for peacekeeping purposes.”152 Conflicts in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic, Moldova, and Ossetia were all areas of emerging skirmishes, commenting on the 
potential need for an armed PKO tool. 153 These new mandates also followed the continued 
offensive of the Azerbaijani Air Force, which bombarded much of Karabakh and solidified 
their hold on the northern regions that was previously captured under Operation Ring.154 
The need for a military intervention seemed to be more and more apparent as the injection 
of Russian heavy weapons and the growth of a military caucus in Russian domestic politics 
further securitized international conflict mediation. The needs of the conflict 
simultaneously shifted from conflict reconciliation to conflict management.  
 Stockholm represented the first failure for the CSCE Minsk group to capitalize on 
the high political will that embodied 1992 and Helsinki II. Though the group had been 
active and relatively successful in constructing a mediating forum, the unilateral mediation 
efforts of Russia in discussing a direct PKO agreement between Russia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan marred much of the early momentum. Despite this interest, Russia participated 
in the Minsk Group prior to 1993. This subsequently blurred who had access to conflict 
mediation in the former Soviet RSC, what types of intervention could be acceptable and 
what issues might become securitized. Consequently, the shift from unreserved cooperation 
in the form of the 1991 Moscow Human Dimension Meeting, to ambiguity about applying 
such agreements led to a scenario where Russia’s intent as a derivative of ‘national interest’ 
was pervasive.155  
December 1992 in Stockholm was the closest any mediation effort had gotten to an 
agreement in the eyes of Maresca. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were prepared to agree to 
a set of conditions leading to peace, but the Azerbaijani delegation pulled out at the last 
minute. Ambassador Maresca commented that this failure was due to a lack of commitment 
from the Minsk Group, with the Italian chair missing the meetings due to family 
commitments and Russia not sending their Minsk Group negotiator due to budgetary 
constraints.156  The lack of Russian attendance was read by some as foreshadowing in line 
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with the ‘Kozyrev speech’ also given at the Stockholm conference. In this speech, the 
Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev took a hard line on CSCE involvement in the 
post-Soviet space, warning the international community of what could happen if hard liners 
took power in Moscow. This was somewhat ironic, because the previous year Kozyrev 
published articles arguing the need for human rights and integration with the West as a 
foundation for a new Russia.157 This further underlines the volatility of political winds, and 
hence concurrent security strategy in Moscow during the early 1990’s.   
The Swedes took the failure of NK mediation at Stockholm personally, putting an 
emphasis on preventative diplomacy in 1993. They also agreed to take over the Minsk 
Group chairmanship from the Italians in the fall of ’93, even though that position was not 
supposed to be a rotating chair.158 The supposedly private deal to shift the Minsk Group 
Chairmanship may have further enhanced the atmosphere of competition in the Minsk 
Group, trying the patience of others attempting to restrain from unilateralism themselves.159 
Despite the invigorated will from Sweden, the foreshadowing of the ‘Kozyrev speech’ and 
growing inclinations for unilateralism were accurate barometers of what 1993 would look 
like for the CSCE. 
 1992 was a capstone year for the CSCE as the institution had its highest levels of 
credibility. It “had not yet been identified with the failures in former Yugoslavia and was 
not yet understood to be limited by Russian policy to areas outside of the former Soviet 
Union.” With regards to NK, “the parties to the conflict were uncertain of their ability to 
withstand coherent international pressure.”160 While it may have been a ripe moment for 
conflict resolution, CSCE rapporteurs to the region understood that any solution would 
require a security guarantor, hence the beginning of the PKO narrative within the CSCE. 
While a PKO was a necessary condition agreed on by most parties, the initiative was 
lacking leadership within the CSCE. Regrettably, most Western states considering it best to 
just “leave it to the Russians.”161 While smaller states such as Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and 
Finland took extraordinary responsibility for the resolution of emerging conflicts in the 
former Soviet Union, they asserted that for the CSCE to wield the legitimacy of consensus, 
all participating states needed to have an interest in conflict resolution, not just a few.  
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The virtually duel track mediation that existed between the CSCE and Russia was 
not the only competition that existed. As Armenian and Azerbaijan struggled to negotiate 
with a singular voice and stabilize their respective strategic cultures, the same questions can 
be applied to Russia. Within the Russian foreign policy establishment there was 
competition between the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry. The Defense Ministry 
was the most qualified candidate if one was to look for an organization that knew the land 
and local power dynamic. The intent to reassert control over their previous domain further 
manifested itself during 1993 and 1994, continuing from the various 1992 defense 
initiatives as mentioned previously. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir 
Kazimirov allegedly often only heard about parallel military discussions and PKO plans 
coming from the Russian Defense Ministry through the newspaper, reportedly not being 
invited to meetings between the US Minsk Group delegation and the Russian Defense 
Ministry.162 This lack of internal policy coordination vaguely resembles the contradictory 
perspectives of Armenian and Azerbaijani political and military leaders from 1992-1993. 
These competitions for power and influence were possibly a product of the lack of control 
Moscow wielded over military commanders in the former Soviet space during 1990-1994. 
Mihalka claims this led to a sense of impudence among the Russian military elite.163 The 
historic narrative of Russian mediation regarding a lack of internal subordination 
influenced how participating states questioned the ability of Moscow to actually control a 
PKO and hence, Russia as a continuing security provider. This theme was fleshed out as the 
year continued, culminating with the Budapest Summit and the first Chechnyan war.  
The brutal fighting from the December 1993 Azerbaijani offensive continued until 
the Russian brokered ceasefire of May 1994. Leading up to May, both the Swedish Chair of 
the Minsk Group Jan Eliasson and the Russian duo of possible PKO commander Georgy 
Kondratyev and Special Envoy Kazimirov made competing trips to the region in search of 
peace.164 Russia finally prevailed in producing a durable ceasefire, but in preparatory 
meetings regarding post-conflict measures, issues over a PKO were again a stumbling 
block. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Gerchev required an 1800 troop PKO, but 
Azerbaijan emphatically differed, giving the CSCE a new opportunity.165 The ceasefire held 
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and with the threat of further territorial loss for both sides diminished, the competition for 
rights to mediate, as well as production of the highly valued PKO, continued. 
3.6 Realization of Confrontation 
The beginning of 1993 marked the shift in Russian policy that was signaled at 
Stockholm the previous year. Yeltsen announced in February that stopping armed conflicts 
in the post-Soviet space was a special responsibility of Russia and international 
organizations should recognize and grant Russia special powers “as guarantor of peace and 
stability in regions of the former USSR.”166 The verbalization of Russian PKO priorities for 
the former Soviet space, as well as a tougher stance on what Russia should gain from 
international institutions became apparent in the Minsk Group. According the Maresca, the 
Russian Minsk Group delegation worked against most collective initiatives, even when 
they coincided with what Russia wanted from the peace process. When this new Russian 
negotiating stance was relayed up Western diplomatic chains of command, it was meet with 
disbelief and unwillingness to accept such a change in Russian attitudes.167 The advent of 
Swedish Foreign Minister af Ugglas as Chairperson-in-Office and the ascension of Sweden 
as the Chair of the Minsk Group further complicated relations with Russia.168 Stockholm 
was interested in pursuing its own shuttle diplomacy with af Ugglas making personal trips 
to the Transcaucasia region, even though Maresca warned that if the work of the Minsk 
Group deteriorated due to bilateralism, the US would not be able to balance Russia. 
Maresca considered that the Russian fear of Western involvement was largely due to the 
US, who initially proposed the Minsk Group forum. Ironically, the US refused to take any 
significant responsibility in the mediation process.169  
This American perception of bilateralism and preference for NATO as a post-Cold-
War structure was a clear goal after 1989. The US’s position was summed up by President 
Bush Sr. in a communiqué to the French: 
The North Atlantic Alliance is an essential component of Europe’s future. I do not 
foresee that the CSCE can replace NATO as the guarantor of Western security and 
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stability. Indeed, it is difficult to visualize how a Europe collective security 
arrangement including Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the Soviet Union, would 
have the capability to deter threats to Western Europe…NATO is the only plausible 
justification in my country for the American military presence in Europe. If NATO 
is allowed to wither because it has no meaningful political place in the new Europe, 
the basis for a long-term US military commitment can die with it.170 
This vision helps historians read why America saw redefining European security with 
CSCE conflict resolution tools as a threat to American security identity and strategic 
culture. Like Russia, American strategic culture incorporates the memory of WWII as a 
legitimizing myth for American power and exceptionalism. 
This US disinterest in the CSCE was expressed through active support against 
institutionalization offered by small states beginning at the 1990 Paris Summit. The US 
delegation took a markedly different approach in 1990 than at Geneva and Helsinki 1973-
75. In an American self-reflection on 73-75, the US allegedly sat back and allowed the 
Europeans to take the lead.171 In 1990 however, with more intangibles and the potential 
shift of American strategic culture due to the perceived loss of a significant other (USSR), 
the US seemed prepared to maintain strength and disallow the Soviets from finding their 
way in the back door of a new European security architecture. This materialized in US 
opposition to a new institutional framework of the CSCE. Proposals the US opposed 
included: two ministerial meetings a year, new institutions for combating the evolving 
political crises across the former WP area and Soviet Union, a physical Conflict Prevention 
Center, and increased openness for greater human movement. 172  The proposal of two 
ministerial meetings per year was reduced to one and more liberal human movement 
agreements were denied due to American opposition, even though Basket III issues had 
been an initial focus of US support for the CSCE process.173 Most significantly, the US 
delegation was strongly opposed to the CSCE taking any new role in crisis management. In 
their view, the CSCE was a forum for arms negotiations and NATO was the only pan-
European institution needed for crisis management, even if it would need to extend to the 
East first.174 The continued vision that the East and West were opposing actors colored 
American support for the CSCE and emerging crisis management tools such as a PKO 
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throughout the 1990’s, retarding institutional growth. Looking from the opposite side, this 
opposition solidified support of small states to the CSCE, as institutional evolution and 
conflict management continued to develop despite this opposition.  
As the conflict of mediation continued to percolate on the European wide level, the 
results of 1993 in local, South Caucasian politics begged the question of if either Armenia 
or Azerbaijan were able to function cohesively and therefore, able to negotiate with a 
singular voice. As the rhetoric of Armenian and Azerbaijani officials showed in 1992 and 
early 1993, there was a preconception that the region needed a security provider. The 
interest each side had for Russia to fulfill that role dependent on who was in charge of local 
politics at any particular moment. This was contrasted in 1993 by two statements from af 
Ugglas about Sweden’s work throughout 1993 to ignite CSCE mediation: 
I said many times during my visits to the Transcaucasian CSCE states last year that 
the CSCE cannot solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem for the parties 
… 
In my view, there has been a propensity to ascribe the lack of progress in conflict 
resolution to technical factors like the low level of the mediation efforts or 
insufficient competence or vision on the part of the local CSCE presence in the 
conflict area, when the real problem has been the absence of unequivocal political 
support from member states.175 
This commentary reveals two insights. The first being that while the CSCE undertook 
efforts to mediate the NK conflict, they only became familiar with the full weight of the 
historic security structures they were inserting themselves into over time. The perceptions 
of actors such as Sweden and their posture towards Russia clearly progressed from not 
knowing how to deal with Russia at Paris in 1990, to implicitly recognizing them as one of 
the primary inflammatory actors in the region. Af Ugglas’ account presents the perception 
that the CSCE’s vision was not to fill the void Russia had left, but rather to create space, by 
restraining Russia, so that the principle of sovereign equality would allow Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to take more responsibility in their own security. Af Ugglas, in her second 
comment, clearly alludes to the inability of the CSCE to win over Russia (and the US) in 
regards to implementing the principles of the Final Act in NK mediation. That being said, 
the focus of Armenian and Azerbaijani elites in their 1992-1993 statements showed interest 
in finding an alternative security structure as a determinate of great powers. This could be 
accomplished either through Russia, Turkey, Iran, or NATO, rather than taking personal 
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responsibility for a RSC. There was a fundamental difference of opinion in how regional 
security should be produced. Therefore, when De Wall commented on Armenia and 
Azerbaijan not being ready for peace as late as 2013, it can be interpreted as the parties not 
being ready for the type of regional security the CSCE/OSCE was attempting to open up 
due to deeper memory politics and hence, foundations of strategic culture. 
Af Ugglas as CiO understood the ability of the CSCE as a young institution was 
dependent on the political will of participating states. She also understood the growing 
conflict between the organization and Russia over mediation, citing the need for CSCE 
pressure via participating states’ senior officials to persuade Russia to withdraw troops 
from Estonia and other NIS engagements. The conflict in Moldova was a similar 
confrontation in which the CSCE engaged, but lacked support from senior officials, thereby 
allowing Russia unilateral mediation rights under the banner of CSCE involvement.176 
Mihalka commented on how Russia continued to use this strategy of legitimizing 
themselves as the new RSC center of a post-Soviet RSC through international organizations 
so as to regain lost prestige. When this strategy was not successful in obtaining command 
and control and Russian PKO leadership in NK, Russian diplomats spoke out directly 
against the impotency of the CSCE Minsk group prior to the Budapest Summit in 1994.177 
While larger participating states such as the US refused to take a strong position on Russian 
mediation in NK and were negligent about any CSCE initiatives in the region, the unilateral 
diplomacy undertaken by the Swedish and Czechoslovakian CiOs may have been the only 
reason mediation remained within a CSCE framework.  
3.7 International Perspectives and Third Party PKOs 
From an external perspective, the UN resolutions of 1993 vaguely called attention 
to the conflict of mediation taking place within the CSCE. Four resolutions reassert the UN 
endorsement of the CSCE mediation process, but also highlighting the ability of the 
Russian Federation to produce a ceasefire.178 The juxtaposition of the Russian Federation as 
an independent actor outside of the Minsk Group, but ‘in support of’ reaffirms the 
discourse of Russia as the primary security provider. There were also consistent calls by the 
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UN for the CSCE to convene the Minsk Conference as soon as possible and produce further 
monitoring missions to the region. The ability of Russia to achieve limited positive results, 
while the CSCE was only able to produce a limited fact finding mission of experts from 
October 6-14, 1993, may have also influenced the UN and the perspectives of the wider 
international community. 179  While these were the only UN resolutions during the conflict, 
their symbolism gives insight to the mediation debate and perceptions of legitimacy. It also 
gives an outside perspective on the mediation narrative, confirming the assertion offered 
here that conflict over mediation was a relevant trope even to observers of the time. 
Russian peacekeeping as an impartial force lost much of its international credibility 
in the early 1990’s due to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. As a result, Ettore Greco 
comments that Russia began looking toward other international organizations for a renewed 
mandate of force and legitimacy.180  Giamluca Burci in 1997 offers the observation that 
Russia used “one organization against the other [CSCE and UN] so as to weaken them both 
and strengthen its own freedom of movement.” He continues by saying that “Russian 
policy in the OSCE and the UN has been adamantly in favor of preserving a sphere of 
influence for the Russian Federation as the sole effective guarantor of security in the former 
Soviet area.”181 Zagorski confirms these interpretations in a later account, adding that the 
goal of Russian multilateral diplomacy was to work against the changing status quo in the 
post-Soviet space.182 Manifesting through the UN’s legitimization of Russian unilateral 
mediation in reference to CSCE principles throughout ’93, these efforts intensified 
following the CSCE Rome mandate for third party peacekeeping at the end of the year. 
As 1993 dragged on, it became more and more apparent that “without Russian 
support any peacekeeping operation in the Caucasus would have a difficult time; but with 
Russian participation such an operation could have a good chance of success.”183 CSCE 
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participating states clearly had support for a general, philosophical PKO mandate, but the 
ability to finance and field a multinational PKO, much less construct the institutional 
structures needed to manage a PKO became a primary area of concern. Along with 
Yeltsin’s rhetoric demanding the international community recognize Russia’s unique role in 
the former Soviet space to start the year, the idea of a CIS PKO in Nagorno-Karabakh 
began to be floated. This created discontinuity in the Minsk Group because Russia wanted 
an international mandate for the use of force to further legitimize their military presence.184 
The CSCE was defiantly against this because the Helsinki II mandate disallowed the use of 
force and represented a fundamental debate over whether the CSCE would renege on 
previous mandates and what precedent that would set for future CSCE norms. This debate 
personified the deadlock and competition in the Minsk Group during 1993, culminating 
with the Azeri winter offensive and the CSCE Rome Ministerial Council. 
As the fear of direct Russian military intervention and lack of cooperation in CSCE 
mediation increased, the 1993 Rome Ministerial tasked the Committee of Senior Officials 
(CSO) with further investigating the possibility of CSCE third party PKO and their ability 
to fall in line with FA norms. The debate initiated at the Helsinki Summit in ’92 and 
modified at Rome ’93, furthered Russian interest in riding the political will for a CSCE 
PKO and channeling it into funding for a CIS PKO. The general idea was that a third party 
institution, such as the CIS, could create the framework for a multinational PKO the CSCE 
had yet to develop, accommodating much of the structural stability needed. 185 Rome was an 
attempt to bridge the divide between the CSCE and Russia in regards to PKO practices.  
Russia appeared to have two priorities: 1) having a majority Russian assemblage in any 
PKO in NK and thus a majority say in the command and control structure 2) an 
international mandate for the use of force. Numerous CSCE participating states on the other 
hand envisioned a multinational PKO with Russia as the minority troop provider and no 
mandate for the use of force. Azerbaijan was a crucial voice, as they never acquiesced to a 
force with Russian troops, continuing to cause tension in the Minsk Group. Participating 
states agreeing to the middle ground of discussing a CIS PKO under the auspices of the 
CSCE, nuancing the discussion of who was to provide security in the post-Soviet space. 
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After various political factions in Russia trumpeted rhetoric regarding their inherent 
right to a sphere of influence throughout 1993, regional states and former union republics 
strictly opposed such CIS peacekeeping because of the precedent it might set. The Baltic 
States, Ukraine, Turkey, and Azerbaijan continually voiced their inability to acquiesce to a 
joint CSCE/CIS PKO in NK, forcing Russia to abandon the idea within the CSCE during 
the course of 1994.186 The CSCE would have been agreeing to pay in some estimates four 
times the annual budget, for a CIS operation, which had previously been defined by 
majority Russian troops. Russia also refused to yield to CSCE participating states interest 
in having the CSCE administer the chain of command if they provided funding.187 A new 
point of incompatibility was reached and the Russian position on a third Party PKO 
morphed into the interest of obtaining a PKO with a use of force mandate, as well as a more 
favorable chain-of-command for Russian oversight. These points of contention reemerged 
in the FSC PKO review during OSCE institutional consolidation from 1997-2003 (chapter 
three). 
The third party peacekeeping option was partially considered due to the CSCE’s 
increasing involvement with the growing conflict in former Yugoslavia in cooperation with 
the UN and NATO. It was seen as a way of further streamlining the CSCE as a conflict 
management facilitator. Similar to the crisis of purpose that emanated from the quick 
solution to the German issue in 1990 and the uncertainty of how to deal with a new Russia, 
the CSCE was still searching for its place in a new European security architecture. The 
third party PKO debate, while short lived, was an attempt to see what would stick with 
regards to political will and new conflict management strategies. This was coupled with the 
perception that a “successful operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya would [also] 
enhance the authority of the CSCE as a lead institution in situations involving the region of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States.”188 Though third party PKO discussions never 
solidified into a structure for bridging the growing EU and shifting CIS RSC, the rhetoric 
sustained legitimacy as an official CSCE proposal, utilized throughout the PKO debate. 
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3.8 The Spark of a Summit 
The culmination of these four years of political will and what can be defined as a 
democratic euphoria following the end of the Cold War climaxed in Budapest 1994. The 
conference moved to make itself an organization, seeing a special place in the new post-
Cold War order as a self-proclaimed bridge between those who wanted to consolidate 
democracy and those who wanted to begin building it. The CSCE accomplished this by 
recognizing the various lenses of security necessary in safeguarding a European, 
democratic vision.189 Analysts of the time, Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan 
Rosas, commented that “the participating states have given the OSCE the historic 
assignment of stabilizing Europe.”190 The ability to begin such a mission was significant 
because it was an inclusive project that continued to create a new collective security 
consciousness, sustaining the continuity between a traditionally Russian RSC and an 
emerging European supercomplex that they had begun in 1975. That being said, as 
Budapest approached, “it became clear that the ability of the CSCE to field a genuinely 
internationally controlled peacekeeping force for the Karabakh conflict would be a key test 
for the success of the summit leaders in giving the CSCE a meaningful post-Cold war 
conflict resolution role.”191 It would also be further recognition of the narrative clash 
between ‘back to Europe’ and ‘common European home’.  
Prior to the Budapest Summit, President Clinton and President Yeltsen both agreed 
to attend. Weeks before the summit, there was controversy over Clinton’s near decision to 
skip the meetings because the White House had planned a reception for the same day, 
showing the low priority level the CSCE still held in the view of American policymakers. 
Once Clinton did arrive, he used the opportunity to call on the CSCE to take up more 
conflict mediation roles, but only insomuch as NATO was the foundation for European 
security. This led to President Yeltsen cautioning the West, in line with his January 1993 
remarks, that “Europe, not yet having freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War, is in 
danger of plunging into a cold peace.”192  
                                                          
189 Budapest Document 1994: Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era. OSCE Open. Budapest, 
Hungary. December 5-6, 1994. OSCE Open. OSCE-DL https://www.osce.org/mc/39554. (accessed July 5, 
2017). 1-5.  
190 Bothe; Ronzitti; Rosas (ed.) 1997, 511. 
191 Maresca 1996, 491. 
192 Santos, Lori (1994): “Clinton attends CSCE Summit.” United Press International. December 5, 1994. 
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/12/05/Clinton-attends-CSCE-summit/7869786603600/. (accessed 
August 7, 2017). 
 Reynolds 59 
 
The Russian interest in heads-of-states’, summit level agreements and the 
international prestige that went along with them had been apparent since the 1975 Helsinki 
and 1986 Stockholm days. The Russian leadership put a large emphasis on the CSCE 
Budapest summit, hoping to progress some of their regional security interest through an 
internationally legitimate forum. With the continued lack of interest from the United States, 
the crucial legitimizer in the eyes of the Kremlin, there began to be reports of Russia 
slowing its mediation concessions. Though the Budapest document gave a clear mandate 
for CSCE mediation in Karabakh, the two major issues of command and control structures 
and the number of Russian troops in a CSCE PKO were left untouched. In the view of 
Maresca, as in 1975, Russia wanted the legitimacy of the CSCE. They most likely would 
have conceded on previously held positions of command and control and troop composition 
if other substantial actors such as the US had offered high level support for the CSCE 
process.193 As it was Kissinger who obtained Soviet acceptance of far reaching Basket III 
concessions in 1975, and President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and West 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who obtained Gorbachev’s consent for German 
reunification in 1990, Clinton was in a similar position to entice Russia and situate the 
CSCE process for success in the NIS. Because high-level commitment was not there from 
the US, two outcomes occurred. The first being small states were forced to take an even 
larger role in sustaining CSCE prominence in negotiating the NK conflict as political will 
and euphoria deteriorated in the second half of the 1990’s. Secondly, Russia continued to 
raise the issue of command and control as a way of sustaining an impact on both the CSCE 
and their sphere of influence.  
With all the hype leading up to the talks, Budapest successfully became the summit 
where the NK conflict received a comprehensive mandate for mediation and conflict 
management.194 Russia was appointed Minsk Group co-chair along with Sweden, validating 
Russia’s privileged mediation position, albeit within the CSCE mediation process. Sweden 
was replaced by Finland as co-chair in April 1995, falling in line with parts of the Finnish 
narrative that promotes institutionalization of the CSCE.195  The competition over mediation 
reached a climax and the political will reflected in the final document from Budapest, 
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which significantly referred to the Russian Federation by name,196 represented a momentary 
resolution to the question of how to deal with Russia in the NIS. The significance of a 
reference to one participating state is very interesting, as the political will to acknowledge 
one member state is a symbol of the high political will of the period. It is also a historical 
pointer to a larger narrative of CSCE courtship of the Russian Federation. Budapest marked 
fleeting success resulting from the numerous attempts to coopt Russia into CSCE conflict 
mediation structures based on the new interpretations of the Helsinki Decalogue.  
The third party PKO mandate of Rome was also being replaced by the consensus 
affirmation that a multinational PKO would be an essential element of any political 
resolution in NK. Participating states negated Russian attempts to resolve the NK conflict 
with third party CIS peacekeeping forces, rather mandating a multinational OSCE 
peacekeeping force.197 The ability for the CSCE to gain Russian consensus on this measure 
was pivotal, as it marked a new direction in cooperation. The stalemate that plagued the 
Minsk Group of 1993 seemed to be softening. 
 While the issue of competitive mediation seemed to be temporarily averted through 
a summit level consensus document, the low-level deadlock within the Minsk Group 
continued post-Budapest. For Maresca the ability of the CSCE to achieve consensus at a 
ministerial and head of state level, but not in subsequent working groups, highlighted how 
the Minsk Group was used to impede various CSCE participating state’s interests. In the 
opinion of Maresca:  
The Russian problem grew to be so dominant in the mediation process that the 
Russians were later made co-chairmen of the Minsk Group itself. This was seen by 
the Minsk Group participants as the only possible way to gain genuine Russian 
cooperation. The irony has been that even as co-chairman the Russians have 
continued to undercut the work of the Minsk Group.198 
Though CSCE member states made concessions as the heads of state level at Budapest and 
eventually within the Minsk Group, the substantial issues necessary for peace were not 
addressed. While Russian co-option into the CSCE/OSCE mediation format seemed as it 
had been a concession by the Russians, in reality, according to Mihalka, it was what Russia 
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needed to re-attain status as a legitimate RSC.199 Some Western actors went as far as to 
question if Russia was genuine in their efforts to cooperate with outside parties due to 
issues that remained intractable such as command and control. This matter continued to be 
a primary issue of focus post Budapest and was a key issue in shaping how the OSCE 
institutions consolidated post 1994. 
The final Budapest document not only created a mandate for a potential OSCE 
multinational PKO, it also created additional structures to support such action. The High 
Level Planning Group (HLPG), the successor and institutional consolidation of the IOPG, 
was mentioned as a new organ to be constructed and staffed.200 The HLPG became the 
functional arm of any OSCE PKO, responsible for force projection, supply chain logistic, 
commanded structure, and so on. But as will come to be seen in the HLPG narrative, the 
rotating one year terms and subsequent lack of institutional knowledge on the part of most 
HLPG heads led to a need of further interconnectedness and eventual subordination to the 
CPC. The HLPG also became a point of debate for Russia due to their preoccupation with 
OSCE PKO command and control, which was directly influenced by the HLPG. 
The Budapest Summit also made landmark changes in regards to the power of the 
Chairman-in-office (CiO). The position was collectively agreed to be strengthened, with 
specific responsibilities in convincing further economic forums and institutions, 
dispatching personal representatives for regional conflicts, overseeing the planning of the 
new multinational PKO mandate, monitoring and informing OSCE member states of non-
implementation of human rights commitments, as well as working as a liaison with non-
member Mediterranean states.201 The Hungarian Ambassador to the CSCE/OSCE from 
1990-1996, István Gyarmati, portrayed the Charter of Paris as a semblance of European 
optimism, which was reaffirmed with the decisions of the Budapest Summit. 202  The 
significance of the Budapest mandates came to play a significant role in the position small 
states took in the OSCE. Nünlist asserts that from 1995-2015, 75 percent of chairmanships 
were held by small states (defined as states with populations from 1-15 million 
inhabitants).203 While some states turned away from the CSCE due to disillusionment 
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during the 1990-1994 period, the Budapest Summit and the subsequent Hungarian OSCE 
Chairmanship worked to reaffirm the hope of the early 1990’s. In line with the Czech and 
Swedish CiOs, Hungary strengthened the norm of small state leadership. 
3.9 Chechnya and the Road from Paris 
 The Hungarian Chairmanship was a significant part of a larger argumentation in 
support of small states ownership of the CSCE/OSCE through institutionalization. 
Hungary’s addition to this discourse was their initial guidance and implementation of 
OSCE involvement in the First Russian-Chechnya War. Within two weeks of the beginning 
of negotiations, Special Representative to the Chechnyan conflict, Hungarian Ambassador 
Istvan Gyarmati, commented that Russia accepted the need for an international organization 
to participate in internal conflict resolution. This is significant, because the fact that some 
factions still adhered to Gorbachev’s compromises negating ‘non-interference in internal 
affairs’ was surprising even for the Hungarians. Moscow officials, initially suspicious of 
foreign involvement, gradually became more cooperative after they themselves saw the 
horrors of the war. During 1995, the Russian presidential administration was deeply 
uninformed about the ongoing war because the defense and security services were 
sanitizing and withholding information. Yeltsin was making political decisions, which were 
promptly being ignored by politicians and military officials overseeing the conflict. 
Eventually, with the realization of atrocity and inability to enforce a domestic power 
vertical, the OSCE was given a mandate to create political peace.204 This marked one of the 
first times the OSCE was allowed such a unilateral mediation and resolution role, in Russia 
nonetheless. This juxtaposition of the conflict of mediation over NK and the relatively 
quick assertion of institutional mediation in Chechnya showed how far the institution had 
come since 1990 as a cooperative international body able to raise political will when 
needed. Hungary was able to effectively direct this newfound institutional impulse. Though 
the mediation of Chechnya was unsuccessful and had larger implications for relations 
between Russia and the OSCE, the opportunity marked an institutional high point.  
 The ideas associated with strategic culture for Hungary can be seen as a microcosm 
for the evolution of a new European idea of security. Hungary, like many other former 
Warsaw Pact countries, entered a period of internal debate and thus, shifting strategic 
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culture and priorities in the early 1990’s. While Hungary had a clear commitment to Euro-
Atlantic values, the question of how to best achieve those goals was unclear in the 
immediate transition period. Conflict management became a key issue for defining 
sovereign, foreign, and defense policy during Hungary’s security identity crisis from 1990-
1995. According to Peter Tala and Tamas Csiki, the questions of how to produce conflict 
management for Hungary was (and is) inherently associated with “small state syndrome,” 
requiring participation in a larger international organization to achieve these goals. The 
Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship was paralleled by continued violence in the Bosnian War 
as well as the increased role NATO took in the Balkan crisis in 1994. Though Hungary 
took increased leadership in the OSCE in relation to Chechnya during 1995, they 
subsequently produced their first major foreign deployment (military engineers) to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This took place within the framework of the NATO Implementation Force 
(IFOR) in 1996, continuing in the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) after 1997, working 
as a springboard for participation in future EU and NATO conflict management missions.205   
Looking back at the history of Hungry in the CSCE process, there are clues that 
help read the developing strategic culture and Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship. In the early 
years following 1975, Hungarian General Secretary Janos Kadar became “the West’s 
‘favorite communist’” as Hungary became a leading implementer of Basket III in the 
East.206 Kadar understood that the CSCE could be a mechanism to diminish the impact of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine and move away from colonial security (Soviet/Warsaw Pact Super 
Complex RSC) toward a form of security closer to domestic ideals. Hungary looked for 
economic independence and growth similar to the Finnish model for successful neutrality. 
A way to bring the “West closer to the socialist countries,” while successfully navigating 
the Brezhnev doctrine.207 In seeing the image of Finland as a model for Hungary during the 
Cold War years, such similes may have influenced Hungarian support for OSCE conflict 
management and the self-narrative of leadership in the CSCE. The dedication of the two 
countries to OSCE conflict management in the early 1990’s reflects longer traditions of 
commonalities in regards to how domestic security goals could be achieved through the 
CSCE/OSCE. That being said, Hungary’s shifting strategic culture debates in the early 
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1990’s seemed to be colored with a different memory of the communism past compared to 
Finland. This may have influenced the narrative each actor subsequently envisioned for 
their personal idea of a secure Europe. Finland achieved security over the past half century 
through diplomatic and economic means, including a multifaceted security identity through 
the CSCE process, while Hungary only achieved minimal area for movement while being 
part of the Soviet bloc. Thus, newfound sovereignty and the continued struggle in 
addressing the communist past may have pushed Hungary towards NATO as a provider of 
European security after their failed attempts at producing successful conflict management 
structures in Chechnya. Nonetheless, the experience of Chechnya and the precedent 
Hungary set for a new, empowered OSCE chairperson was part of the narrative of OSCE 
evolution as a container for a specific discourse of European security. 
 The Budapest Summit was seen by some observers of the time as an end to the 
conflict in mediation that defined the CSCE’s involvement in the Karabakh conflict from 
1990-1994.208 Russia was technically incorporated into the CSCE mediation process for 
NK, which was seen as one of the OSCE’s first perceived successes as an organization able 
to impact Russian involvement in the Former Soviet union (FSU). Initial access to 
Chechnya was also a sign of the spark offered at Budapest. On the other hand, the war in 
Bosnia continued with NATO taking a more active role in conflict management. Many new 
OSCE member states turned their attention to the existing structures of European security 
due to the limited results the OSCE could produce on short notice. The early period of the 
1990’s was defined by uncertainty in what a new Europe would be, as well as the ideas of 
what newly independent states wanted Europe to become. With domestic and international 
ideas of these conceptions in flux, the CSCE continued to institutionalize. This is a 
testament to the fact that there is an aspect of Europe that requires cooperation with Russia. 
Regardless of the debate between memorialization and repression of the communist period 
for members of the former WP and Russia, the alternative was also present. A memory of 
the CSCE process as a driver of cooperation influenced small states perceptions of what 
type of security the forum could provide. It was also a constant reminder that Russia has an 
inherent definition of Europe incorporated into its identity and memory politics. 
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4 Sustaining Hope – Institutional Evolution 
“The OSCE has been a kind of laboratory for conflict management, progressing by means 
of trial and error.” 
Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas 1996 209 
The narrative of competition over mediation rights in the early 1990’s possessed a 
larger historic significance in the overall CSCE/OSCE evolution. The Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Hungary, among others, continued to push back against 
perceived revision of the new Helsinki Decalogue by reasserting previously agreed upon 
norms. The period after 1995 exhibited greater cooperation by some former WP states with 
NATO as a conflict management body. That being said, the majority of small states still 
remembered the image the CSCE offered throughout history, supporting institutionalization 
even if in a passive form. The PKO narrative post-1995 is a primary example of how small 
states with an experience of success in the CSCE process had the ability to progress the 
vision of security agreed upon at Paris in 1990. The aptitude to sustain previously 
established norms allowed small states to prepare for new liminal moment in history in 
which to spark collective political will similar to Helsinki 1975, Stockholm 1985, Paris 
1990, and Budapest 1994.  
The initial construction of this claim was seen in the previous chapter with the 
advent of small states as CSCE CiOs and their subsequent conflict management leadership. 
The second part of this claim is associated with the institutional evolution of the 
CSCE/OSCE. Many of the organization’s forums and structures where shaped by the NK 
conflict as well as the questions of conflict resolution surrounding it.  At the same time, the 
CSCE/OSCE failed on many occasions to mobilize political will due to a lack of 
institutional foundation and proven conflict management strategies. This crisis of 
functionality was apparent with the conflict of mediation over NK.  
The process of CSCE/OSCE growth in the 1990’s, as mentioned before, was part of 
the debate over whether to implement new or existing post-Cold War structures.210 As 
various actors attempted to pursue OSCE institutionalization in the face of an apprehensive 
consensus around NATO, the pains of constructing new mediation and conflict 
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management structures, as well as satisfying all member states became apparent. In the 
words of Milanova: 
The years-long negotiation efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh expose the arbitrariness 
and selectivity in the support to one or the other principle at various stages of the 
conflict. The attempts to deal with operational matters rather than addressing the 
major concerns behind the conflict raised the parties' fear that their vital interests are 
discarded and largely contributed to their alienation from the OSCE peace activities. 
In the absence of enforcement power, the success of any OSCE initiatives is 
contingent primarily on the goodwill of the parties. Such goodwill will be possible 
on two conditions — precise and well-formulated principles for addressing their 
major concerns and their consistent application.211 
Though it is easy to say that operational matters took priority, the answer to why this was 
and the underlying principles of the actual aim of furthering operational matters is a more 
extensive discussion. There is also the counter point to be made, that operational matters 
were not necessarily negative, as is connoted in Milanova’s account. The CSCE/OSCE 
would not have had the ability to effectively plan a multinational PKO, implement new 
missions, or gain access to Chechnya if the organization had not simultaneously focused on 
operational matters, or institutional evolution. Thus, the question is not what the 
CSCE/OSCE should have focused on, but rather why it was not ready to facilitate peace 
and all the responsibilities that went along with that in the 1990’s. This claim will be 
displayed through the historic evolution of the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), High 
Level Planning Group (HLPG), and Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) from 1990-
2004. 
Other authors and current practitioners such as Ruben Harutunian have echoed this 
perspective, asking the OSCE to address more of the major concerns associated with the 
conflict.212 Again, this is a relatively common claim in the literature, but shows a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the OSCE and its historical purpose as a facilitator and 
forum for cooperation. The CSCE/OSCE process of the 1990’s was an attempt to find a 
middle ground between a purely political dialog and a functional conflict management 
organization. While participating states had a say in both processes, the institutions that 
began to evolve also had a growing influence in these debates, nuancing state interests.  
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Actor’s narratives are critical in contemplating what member states wanted out of this 
process and what responsibility the institution was actually able to take on. 
4.1 HLPG Directives – High Level Planning Group 
 The HLPG story is a specific subset of the OSCE PKO mandate that illustrates the 
significance of institutionalization for sustaining norms during periods of low political will, 
while waiting for new historic moments of opportunity in the negotiation process.  Over the 
years, consideration of a multilateral OSCE security solution caused various degrees of 
discontent for Russia due to shifting strategic culture and domestic politics. As a subset of 
the larger politico-military debate, the independent responsibility the HLPG obtained 
reflected on the larger process of OSCE evolution. The growing possibility of the OSCE 
taking on an identity as a traditional security provider can be viewed as having an impact 
on Russia’s attitude toward the organization as a potential threat of securitization and 
overlay in a post-Soviet RSC.  
The account of HLPG directives goes hand in hand with the various narratives small 
states attempted to write in the OSCE. The HLPG Directives, or requests from the CiO on 
how the HLPG should direct their work under the respective chairmanship, attest to the 
modest amount of autonomous institutional power the CiO had over small, structural 
elements of conflict resolution and institutional evolution. Within this discussion there are 
ten directives during the period of analysis, issued from a variety of CiOs. Directives One 
and Three were not in the archives and therefore are exempt from this analysis. While the 
HLPG directives are a major analytical layer to be considered, questions of funding were 
also a major issue that caused the PKO process to stagnate multiple times and will be 
considered as part of the HLPG discussion. 
Early Euphoria and New Precedents 
 The HLPG began work on the issue of planning an OSCE PKO shortly after its 
mandate was created in Budapest 1994. Taking over for the IOPG, the new HLPG began its 
seminal mandate of constructing options for a multinational PKO.213 The plans took a year 
to devise and present options to participating states, and represented an informal method of 
administering monitoring missions. The first chair of the HLPG, Finnish General Vilén, 
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made trips to the NK region in September 1995 in preparation for a potential deployment. 
He was also able to report on the actual conditions of conflict in the region.214 This 
responsibility gained greater significance over time because visits to the region stopped 
from 1997-2005, even though a majority of participating states were in favor of continued 
HLPG monitoring missions, 
By the 1995 Ministerial Meeting in Budapest, the HLPG had completed initial 
options for a multinational PKO. Options included:  
— Type A. Traditional armed peacekeeping operations of the “blue-helmet” type; 
— Type B. Unarmed observer/monitoring peacekeeping operations; 
— Type C. Combinations of Type A and B; and 
— Type D. Peacekeeping operations with other international organizations, 
including turnkey operations. 215 
On average, any of these missions were expected to utilize 3000 personnel, with an expense 
of $100 million for the first six months.216 The CiO would direct any PKO operation, with 
limited formal structures for direct control from participating states in the actual 
management of the PKO after implementation. These issues of command and control, as 
well as use of force, were primary issues of contention for Russia if the OSCE was to 
produce a PKO in Russia’s perceived RSC. HLPG visits of international military personnel 
to the region, similar to the Czechoslovak mission in 1992, may have become a securitized 
issue for Russia under these emerging conditions. The issue of command and control may 
have been exacerbated in 1995 as well when the HLPG recommended no Russian officers 
in the first military staff proposal for any potential OSCE PKO command and control 
structure. 217 Accordingly, small state support for the HLPG via non-consensus based 
directives will be understood within the possibly securitized context of mediation 
competition and disagreements over command and control. 
 Directives from 1995 to 1996 reflect on the initial period of high political will. 
There was hope that the 1994 HLPG mandate would set the foundation of OSCE mediation 
                                                          
214 Report by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict dealt with by the 
Minsk Conference in distributed at the request of the Chairman-in-Office. November 9, 1995. Document 
Number: REF.SEC/334/95. OSCE Restricted. DCiP. Prague, Czech Republic. 
215 High Level Planning Group: Mission Statement for a Possible Peacekeeping Mission to the Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict. June 27, 1995. Document Number: REF.CIO/23/95. OSCE Restricted. DCiP. Prague, 
Czech Republic. 
216 Ibid. 
217 HLPG Staff List. September 20, 1995. Document Number: REF.CIO/72/95. OSCE Restricted. DCiP. 
Prague, Czech Republic. 
 Reynolds 69 
 
and solidify an OSCE mandated political solution and subsequent multinational PKO. 
Directive Two, issued by the Hungarian chairmanship in 1995 focused on refining the 
functional aspects of the HLPG, such as clarifying the mission, chain of command, 
logistical support, contingency planning, and phased deployments.  Most significantly, the 
wording of the document asserted that planning for an OSCE PKO presented a unique 
opportunity to create a leaner and more cost effective peacekeeping structure. This implied 
that the impact of an OSCE PKO was not only for keeping peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, but 
for modernizing the peacekeeping field internationally.218 This directive also allowed 
Hungary to unilaterally address issues that were not agreed upon in the summit 
environment. Hungary effectively used the power of a newly reinforced chairmanship 
position to strengthening the norm of an OSCE command and control structure, even 
though consensus negotiations only created a vague mandate on the issue. While there is no 
access to Directive Number One or Three, it is almost certain that Directive One was issued 
by the Hungarian CiO, as they were the first CiO to oversee the HLPG. As for Directive 
Three, it is highly likely that it was issued during the Hungarian tenure because Directive 
Four was issued by the subsequent CiO in the first two months of their chairmanship. With 
the new minimalist tools for institutionalization offered by HLPG directives, OSCE 
participating states positioned themselves for a political solution in NK. In the opinion of 
Vilén, such actions were critical in building confidence for Armenian and Azerbaijan, 
showing that the OSCE could act when needed.219 
 The fourth directive was not as significant as the Hungarian issuance. Disseminated 
in 1996 by the Swiss chairmanship, it sustained the process and reiterated the significance 
of OSCE organs. Directive Four most pointedly asserted that any political agreement 
should be dependent on the recommendations of the HLPG and said recommendations 
should be the basis for OSCE decision making bodies as they move forward with a PKO in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.220 The second point is significant because it shifts the responsibility 
and likelihood of success in a mediated peace to all member states of the OSCE as they 
would now need to be involved in a multinational PKO. It also attempts to conceptually 
place the HLPG within the context of a larger OSCE institutionalization process, making 
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the HLPG interdependent on other OSCE conflict management organs, much like the 
evolution of the CPC will show.  
The presentation of Directive Four by the Swiss is also important when looking at 
the larger position they took in the CSCE/OSCE process regarding the democratization of 
conflict management. Similar to the Valleta mechanism (see CPC section) that the Swiss 
pursued over a three decade span, the facilitation of a multination OSCE PKO function held 
similar aims. While the OSCE did not have the collective political will to continually push 
Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan towards a settlement and a potential shift in how security 
was perceived in the region, they did have the ability to continue evolving OSCE structures 
to indirectly influence the mediation process.  
Swiss strategic culture, similar to Finland, Austria, and other N+N states, continues 
to have a deep commitment to international institutions seen through the CSCE process. 
Their burdening of responsibility for hosting substantial meetings for the initial CSCE from 
1973-1975 were more labor intensive than the short, half-month conference Finland hosted 
for the heads of states’ signing ceremony. Switzerland, like Finland, has maintained its 
support for the OSCE regardless of the shifting winds of NATO, leading some to propose 
that Switzerland be the permanent chair of the OSCE.221 While neither a member of the EU 
or NATO, it seemed that the narrative Switzerland wrote in the CSCE/OSCE process was 
more insulated from the prospect of a better alliance. That being said, Christian Nünlist and 
Benno Zogg argue that Switzerland is “deeply anchored in the Western camp,” rarely 
taking sides or assigning blame, “not least in order to keep open its option to mediate 
between parties to the conflict.”222 In this vain, the Swiss 1996 chairmanship in a period of 
deteriorating political will stressed the need for an “enhancement of the OSCE’s 
operational capabilities” so as to cement a realistic security model.223 Swiss leadership was 
also significant in facilitating the 1996 Lisbon Summit that unlike the Paris Summit in 
1990, proclaimed a “Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 
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twenty-first century” and the beginning of new negotiations on a Treaty on Common 
Forces in Europe (CFE).224 Conversely, with the 1999 crisis of cooperation seen at Istanbul, 
partially emanating from NATO action in Kosovo, the Swiss turned back toward their role 
of credible impartiality, building up bilateral ties with Russia.225 Despite the shifting foreign 
policy narratives, Switzerland played a leading role in the institutional and PKO debates 
after 1995, when liminal support from numerous new participating states drifted. 
Switzerland was also the only participating state to chair the OSCE twice (1996, 2014), 
with a special request for Swiss leadership following the advent of conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. 
 Directive Number Five issued by the Danish Chairmanship in 1997 was the final 
directive from this initial period of political will within OSCE leadership, marked by the 
ability of the HLPG to visit the NK region. This directive reiterated the importance of all 
previous directives, while also pushing the HLPG to be an internationally active body. It 
requested the creation of a quick start-up fund in preparation for quick deployment, holding 
on to the sentiment of 1995 that the HLPG was prepared for regional deployment.226 This 
directive was in response to participating states concerns with the initial proposals 
presented by the HLPG in 1995. While rapid deployment was presented in the initial four 
PKO options, the United States critiqued the ability of the OSCE to rapidly deploy a PKO 
in 1996 following the presentation of initial HLPG options, asserting that it would take up 
to nine months to effectively deploy in theater.227 The Danish CiO attempted to directly 
address the OSCE’s ability to produce a PKO by implementing unilateral political will, 
endeavoring to construct a mechanism to address issues with the initial PKO plans. 
The idea of rapid deployment presented in Directive Five also coincides with the 
issue of funding, which was a point of contention throughout the multinational OSCE PKO 
discussion. Funding became a crucial issue when the initial proposal from the HLPG in 
1995 was to be three times the annual budget of the organization (in 1996 roughly $30 
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million yearly budget compared to a $93-$150 million proposed PKO budget).228 As 
mentioned by Vilén, while the funding was high, the value of a multinational, consensus 
based PKO had unparalleled legitimacy. As political will had been mobilized in 1992, 
funding for a PKO was also a possibility in his eyes.229 That being said, the budget of the 
OSCE did rise exponentially following the Budapest Summit, jumping from around €19 
million in 1995, to its highest levels ever, or about €200 million in 2000. While the HLPG 
proposal for an OSCE PKO cannot be viewed as the sole reason for such an increase, the 
overall OSCE institutional evolution and perspective to take on new fields of conflict 
management was clearly supported by participating states financial commitments. This 
trend, again not associated directly with the HLPG, does give insight to Vilén’s positive 
attitude of the OSCE to produce a PKO costing over €100 million.  
The Danish directive also paralleled further shifts in the Minsk Group Co-Chair 
composition. After taking over Sweden’s role in 1995, Finland transferred its co-chair 
position to France in January 1997. Due to Azerbaijani discontent, the US was incorporated 
as a third co-chair in February 1997.230 The deterioration of small state leadership in the 
Minsk Group can also be interpreted as part of the longer post-Cold War narrative away 
from the idealist narratives of the early 1990’s that asserted geopolitics was no-longer a part 
of European security. 231 The sober realization that a plethora of narratives remained 
dependent on the paradigm of great power status and geo-political identity is a critical 
consideration. This was further amplified after 1999 over how the European security order 
was developing.  
Danish strategic culture, according to Sten Rynning, is highly influenced by Cold 
War memories, as well as the opening the collapse of the Soviet Union offered Europe. 
Rynning asserts that Danish foreign policy makers, though understanding the limitations of 
being a small state and preserving human rights and democracy as core values, “retained a 
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political ambition to affect the international environment in the long term.”232 This led to 
greater international activism in 1989 with a conservative government in power, attempting 
to promote new Danish leadership internationally. The Social Democratic Party continued 
this trend in 1992, purportedly due to their haunted memories of party compromise during 
the Cold War.233 Danish leadership of the OSCE in 1997 can be seen as an amiable part of 
achieving this self-narrative. Directive Five and attempts to structure new OSCE conflict 
management organs, taking a leadership role in doing so, can be read as ambition in the 
international arena. But as Rynning argues, after formulating a strategy for achieving 
influence in international politics, Denmark fully turned its back on the cultivated neutrality 
of the 20th century. This was seen through Danish participation in military interventions 
abroad in an attempt to cultivate the image as a ‘strategic actor’, participating in the 1999 
NATO air campaign in Kosovo, US interventions in Iraq, and US intervention in Libya. 
Like some former WP members, Denmark too used the 1990’s as a period of soul searching 
and the OSCE as a forum for cultivating the image of a ‘strategic actor’. Regardless, they 
seemingly drifted toward the established structures of Atlanticist security and their 
established position within NATO as the liminal period of European euphoria began to 
normalize. 
Directive Six issued by the Polish CiO in 1998 only reaffirmed the importance of 
the HLPG and recommended further cooperation with the Minsk Group.234 That being said, 
the fact that the NK conflict still came up on the CiO’s radar as a priority within the first 
three months of taking office signified the continuing temporal importance of Nagorno-
Karabakh for the OSCE. Directive Six was a stark shift from previous directives affirming 
the HLPG’s recommendations as a foundation for all other political decision making 
structures within the OSCE, to simply a request for further support of the Minsk Group. 
This hints at declining political will for implementing the established norm of an OSCE 
PKO in regions other than NK. Directives asserting that the HLPG should take a secondary 
role in the conflict management process also implied a shift from active preparation for 
implementing a PKO, to reassertion of norms and structures in hope of future windows of 
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opportunity. A new directive guiding HLPG work, signifying CiO dedication to the NK 
conflict, was not issued for the next five years, paralleling the hiatus of HLPG activity in 
the NK region. 
Polish strategic culture is also significant in interpreting Directive Six. Poland’s 
security perceptions in the 1990’s are described by Marcin Terlikowski as a ‘gray zone’ 
with no security guarantor, as they made accession to NATO and the EU priorities in 1989, 
only being accepted in 1999. Terlikowski argues the memory of communism seemingly 
had an impact on these perceptions because in his opinion, the Polish military and Polish 
society marginalized Soviet propaganda and widely resented Soviet power.235 This memory 
of Polish society as united against Soviet power presents the idea of occupation as a 
conceptual frame, which validate Polish security interest in NATO as a legitimate memory 
claim in the ‘back to Europe’ narrative.  
Traditional military defense was also a key container of national identity for 
Terlikowski due to Poland’s troubled geopolitical past, leading Polish elites in 2007 to 
define NATO as a cornerstone of Polish security. Poland, while also lacking general 
interest in international intervention, developed a keenness for conflict management 
operations over the years (specifically after accession to NATO) as a way of collecting 
security capital and benefits. Poland also supported democratic reforms in various post-
Soviet states beginning in 1991, being one of the first states to call on the EU to open a 
monitoring mission to Georgia in 2009 after the OSCE was barred by Russia.236 The Polish 
OSCE chairmanship of 1998 can be read in relation to this developing perception of 
security, as Directive Six shows a blasé, but potentially calculating approach to actively 
supporting conflict management. Poland may have been looking for a way of building 
security capital, while simultaneously preparing to write themselves into the existing 
narrative of NATO based Atlanticist security. Thus, Polish strategic culture of the 1990’s, 
like Armenia and Azerbaijan, struggled to find a new security provider, while 
simultaneously looking for ways to maintain security leverage. 
The period following the last HLPG pseudo-monitoring missions to the region in 
1997 marked a further closing of previous windows of opportunity. The period within the 
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CSCE/OSCE where Russia was as a willing negotiating partner and all member states 
remained actively accountable to the agreements of Paris 1990 began to fade in 1993. The 
window began to close with the ‘Kozyrev speech’ in Stockholm to end 1992 and Yeltsen’s 
rhetoric of a privileged position for Russia in the post-Soviet Space beginning in 1993. 
Notwithstanding, significant institutionalization was still achieved within the CSCE, 
facilitating important cooperation until post Lisbon, 1996. Directives by the CiO hint at this 
deteriorating political will through the greater need for unilateral action from the chairman 
to attend to the conflict. The diminishing significance of the directives’ content also 
supports this observation. Conversely, the need for strong leadership shaped the 
chairmanship position into a conflict management tool of its own, if only momentarily. For 
those who wanted to take responsibility in the OSCE, such as the many small states who 
held the position in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, they had limited capacity to work 
independently in regard to conflict resolution. 
Divergence and Division 
The Istanbul Summit of 1999 was a significant contextual point in the wider post-
Cold War political narrative. Dissatisfaction with the authoritative role the OSCE took 
regarding the Chechnya conflict as well as sanctions participating states put on Russia in 
other regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh set the mood prior to Istanbul. At the summit, 
Yeltsin presented a similar rhetoric of inherent Russian internists in the former Soviet 
Space to what he had shown at Budapest 1994. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) was amended, but not implemented and “senior Russian military figures 
[had] gone further…even suggesting the US [strived] to perpetuate tension in the Caucasus, 
with the aim of weakening Russia on the international stage.”237 The NATO Bombings in 
the former Yugoslavia also marked a significant misperception of the Russian narrative by 
NATO countries and remains an issue of contention today.238 Istanbul was followed by 
internal succession of Yeltsen by Vladimir Putin, bringing Russia a new perspective on 
international cooperation. Several factions within Russia still maintained faith in the OSCE 
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as a new international forum more amiable to their interests than NATO. Russian 
discontent during 1999 was read by some Americans as part of a longer attitude of 
disgruntlement with status in a new, post-Cold War world. 239 While in the Russian 
narrative actions taken in 1999 were a legitimate assertion of red lines, for some Americans 
it may have looked like diplomatic ploys in the longer struggle to regain prestige lost after 
the Cold War. 
 No HLPG directives were issued from 1999-2002. Directive Seven issued in 2003 
was a reflection on the 2002 Porto Ministerial Council meeting and hope that a new 
window of opportunity was in the making. Directive Seven issued by the Dutch CiO 
requested renewed missions to the region from the HLPG, which had been inactive since 
1997.  All previous mandates were also requested to be updated. The wording by the Dutch 
CiO implied that the HLPG had done none, if any work on PKO planning from 1997-2003 
because they referred to 1997 as the appropriate starting point for all future planning.240 The 
request that all previous mandates be updated was a reference to the FSC debate that 
occurred from 2002-2003 (see FSC section) and are interpreted here as a coded response 
affirming the norms of 1992. Different from all previous directives discussed, there was no 
timetable offered for implementing the request. This could imply that the amount of work 
needed to bring HLPG planning up to standard was substantial and required an entirely new 
report on an OSCE multinational PKO. The previous recommendation report from Vilén in 
1995 was over 500 pages.  Directive ‘Seven A’ was also a significant indicator of OSCE 
hopes for post-conflict peace mediation. It reiterated support for HLPG plans to be drafted 
in general terms so that they could be the basis for any future OSCE stabilizing and peace 
support missions. Seven A also recommended further cooperation with the CPC, OPU, and 
other OSCE structures.241 The recommendations for generic planning and further 
institutional integration suggested that the idealistic hope that the OSCE could continue to 
expand its conflict management toolbox and a consensus security model as a common 
narrative of European security in the post-Soviet space was still alive. 
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 That being said, Porto 2002 was also an important moment for a rethinking of the 
power of the CiO. Walter Kemp commented that the power of the CiO is largely a myth 
due to the mandate given at Porto, which states: ‘its actions are not inconsistent with 
positions agreed by all the participating States.’”242 Conversely, his investigation is largely 
post Porto, not commenting on the earlier responsibilities mandated after Budapest 1994. 
The subsequent precedents various chairmanships set for the CiO’s role in institutional 
evolution are also not considered. These precedents, seen in the HLPG directives, gives a 
subtle commentary on the image of the CiO that did sustain after 2002 as a subset of the 
responsibilities that were cultivated in relation to the 1994 CiO mandate. 
 The Netherlands, as a founding member of both NATO and the EU, had a strong 
security identity at the end of the Cold War, though tested by the flowing perceptions of 
Europe. Still holding a constitutional commitment to supporting human rights and the 
international order, Jörg Noll and René Moelker comment that the interpretation of these 
values shifted in relation to domestic and European security in the 1990’s. The Dutch were 
one of the first NATO members to modify their military model from conscription to a 
smaller expeditionary force. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre, where Dutch peacekeepers 
were unable to stop the killing of more than 7,000 Bosnians, was a primary reason for 
Dutch force reconsideration and modernization.243 This experience had a profound impact 
on the Netherlands self-image as a conflict manager, subsequently influencing how Dutch 
strategic culture chose to support international order after 1995. As argued by Noll and 
Moelker, the Netherlands continued to participate in NATO operations and view activity in 
NATO, the EU, OSCE, and UN as critical. Nevertheless, strategic interests shifted more 
towards economic considerations and security for Dutch global economic endeavors. In 
turn, this degraded “the broker position it held for many decades.”244  
Directive Seven and Seven A of the Dutch chairmanship can be interpreted as an 
interest in keeping the OSCE PKO capabilities up to date, possibly influenced by a specific 
experience of security and conflict management. After the experience of 1995 at 
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Srebrenica, the Netherlands understood what could happen if outdated force structures and 
planning were the basis for a peacekeeping operation. At the same time, Barend argues that 
Dutch foreign policy, as it was 40 years ago, remains largely reactive, rather than active.245 
In this frame, Directive Seven and Seven A should be considered in line with larger support 
for OSCE institutionalization, as well as the 2002 FSC debate that reinvigorated political 
will. As various Dutch narratives looked to make an impact on the world, the reinvigorated 
PKO debate and the Dutch CiO of 2003 offered an opportunity to write NK mediation and 
wider OSCE institutionalization into this narrative. 
 Directive Seven and the FSC Debate of 2002-2003 followed US attempt to restart 
negotiations in the Minsk Group by bringing all parties to Key West Florida in 2001. With 
renewed interest from the new Bush Administration to find a solution for Nagorno-
Karabakh, the US subsequently hosted negotiations under the auspices of the Minsk Group 
at Key West on April 3, three months after President Bush’s inauguration. The US signaled 
their prioritization of the South Caucasus, when U.S. Ambassador and Minsk Group Co-
Chair Carey Cavanaugh referred to Key West as “‘a bold and significant step forward.’” 246 
This may have been read by Russia as renewed American efforts to change the RSC 
dynamic in the South Caucasus, potentially securitizing what had become a relatively 
frozen RSC. On the other hand, some actors within the American Foreign Policy 
community consider NK a forum where the US and Russia build trust, potentially making 
Key West an olive branch in the American narrative after 1999. 
While the negotiations of 2001 were unsuccessful, they signified interest from the 
US. Russia’s subsequent actions within OSCE forums to restart the PKO debate on 
command and control are interpreted here as nervous vigor. Thus, Directive Seven was a 
further spark to the OSCE PKO debate, in support of previously established norms. Though 
the US was able to stimulate international interest in NK following a period when political 
will had stagnated from 1997-2001, actual functionality of the OSCE in terms of the FA 
and OSCE norms needed to be engaged by small states. The Porto Ministerial Meetings of 
2002, Maastricht in 2003, and the Dutch Chairmanship of 2003 all represent the re-
application of interest by small states in sustaining the norms established in the 1990’s.  
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The HLPG did not implement Directive Seven, subsequently questioning HLPG 
functionality after five years of stagnation. Vilén commented that if operation planning did 
not occur, participating states would not take an active interest in the conflict. While this 
noted the low period of political will from 1997-2001, it also hinted at the related 
conclusion that without member states interest, the planning of the HLPG also stagnated. In 
his writings after being HLPG chair, Vilén mentioned that operation planning progress had 
a positive effect on the parties’ willingness to agree to a political solution. The stagnation of 
the HLPG from 1997-2000 causes the possibility of a lost opportunity in conflict resolution 
at Key West in 2001. It also could have influenced the OSCE’s ability to review 1995 
recommendations in a timely manner because so much had changed on the ground that 
neither participating states nor the HLPG were aware of.  
Vilén also commented after his tenure as HLPG chair that the perspective of the 
OSCE changed due to the Yugoslav conflicts. The initial goal of the HLPG had been solely 
military, but as the institution matured and consolidated, an OSCE PKO became an 
economic, humanitarian, political, arms control, and military project.247 Even when 
attention was refocused on the HLPG in 2002-2003 through the renewed interest in the 
conflict stemming from FSC debates and the various CiO directives, it seemed to take a 
substantial period of time for the HLPG to catch up with greater OSCE modernization. 
HLPG Epilog 
Directive Number Eight issued by the Slovenian Chairmanship in 2005 restated the 
faith of the Dutch CiO from 2003, also showing that the hope for a new window of 
opportunity was still only hope. The HLPG was again requested to revisit the region, 
implying that the HLPG had still not fulfilled the requests from Directive Seven. A new 
request was submitted, detailing that the HLPG should take on new responsibility and 
monitor the line of contact (LOC) in cooperation with the CiO Special Representative to the 
Minsk Group. Operational Concept 1-4, from General Vilén’s original PKO proposal were 
requested for review, reiterating the call from the Dutch chairman that the entire PKO 
proposal from the 1990’s be reexamined and reformed for the current decade.248 The fact 
that the HLPG did not act immediately to the request of the Dutch chairman in 2003 allows 
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for interpretation of what the political will within the OSCE was like in that historic period. 
The lack of OSCE military personnel visiting the region also raises the question of how 
Russia’s image of the region changed with OSCE disengagement from a regrouping South 
Caucasus RSC. If read through the lens of Russian military modernization, this may have 
endowed the self-narrative reaffirmed in 1992 that this region was governed by Russian 
security politics. This could have been a reason for the HLPG taking three years to achieve 
the Dutch request for new visits to the region. OSCE military personnel may have become a 
more securitized issue after their absence became the new normal from 1997-2005. 
Irrespective, the OSCE established offices in Yerevan and Baku in 2000, further nuancing 
the idea of which norms of security were securitized. Human rights issues, while remaining 
a tender issue for Russia due to Chechnya, may not have been as securitized within the 
context of OSCE missions at this moment. Notwithstanding, the work of the Netherlands 
and Slovenia was a direct reassertion of agreed upon norms from 1992 and 1995; the norm 
that the OSCE would be the primary mediation structure as well as the guarantor of peace 
after political agreements were agreed upon. 
 2007 confirmed that the directives from 2003 and 2005 were again only faith that a 
new window of opportunity would soon open. Directive Nine from the Spanish 
Chairmanship asserted that the new mandate was created in cooperation with all 
representatives of the Minsk Group and all future work of the HLPG should be focused on 
recon and monitoring the LOC.249 These tempered requests showed that the political will of 
the conflicting parties did not materialize when the OSCE hoped it would after 2003 and 
2005.  Spain also reasserted it priorities as CiO, which were: priorities, perseverance, and 
patience. This mantra was the embodiment of reasserting mundane directives and mandates 
to sustain the norms of the 1990’s in hope of a future window of opportunity. There was 
hope that 2001 would be the beginning of a new mobilization of political will in regards to 
NK. Small states were able to sustain norms and reaffirm inter-dimensional peacekeeping, 
but they were unable to muster consensus and ripeness similar to that seen in the early 
1990’s. 
                                                          
249 Spanish Chairman-in-Office: Statement Delivered by the Chairperson of the Permanent Council on the 
Chairman-in-Office’s Directive No. 9 for the OSCE HLPG at the 659th Meeting of the Permanent Council. 
March 29, 2007. Document Number: CIO/GAL/49/07. OSCE +. DCiP. Prague, Czech Republic. 
 Reynolds 81 
 
 Within the first month of their chairmanship, Finland implemented Directive Ten. 
While the directive was very similar to the Spanish directive, it requested that the HLPG 
maintain a conceptual basis for implementing a PKO, showing continued vision for wider 
OSCE PKO tools.250 While there was not much substantiality added to the HLPG mission 
through Directive Ten, Finland did fight hard to acquire budgetary funding for the HLPG to 
have a permanent office in Vienna. This further solidified the concept of the HLPG as a 
permanent organ of the OSCE with potential to sustain post conflict resolution in Nagorno-
Karabakh. Contextually speaking, this was on the eve of the 2008 Georgia war and Putin’s 
2007 Munich Security Conference warning to the West. Munich 2007 was significant 
because not only did President Putin argue against the perceptions of growing American 
predominance, but also against the OSCE’s growing bureaucratic bias.251 Putin directly 
reaffirmed the sanctity of internal affairs, accusing the OSCE institution of taking on an 
unequal role in promoting the human dimension. Putin’s account of how the OSCE was 
developing again supports argumentation that Russia considered OSCE involvement in a 
perceived Russian RSC as a securitized issue, with specific regard to the human dimension. 
OSCE norms and institutionalization of the 1990’s and early 2000’s were challenged by 
growing Russian dissatisfaction with existing European narratives of security. The Georgia 
War also seemed to mark a decline in OSCE member states’ interest in the OSCE as a 
primary conflict management organ, with the EU forced to step in as the main conflict 
manager. If the common narrative of European security had not died in 1999 in Istanbul, it 
was in critical condition as of 2008. 
 The narrative of the various directives spanning from 1992-2008 show a defined 
reassertion of previous norms by small states. Hungary, Switzerland, Poland, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands all worked unilaterally within the OSCE to sustain norms that had 
previously been established in periods of high political will. The OSCE constantly fought 
with its internal identity of being a consensus based organization, with institutional organs 
and small states finding new ways to continually build the OSCE’s structural capacity and 
conflict management toolbox. These structures created an environment where the 
legitimacy of a consensus based security order could be harnessed during new historic 
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windows of opportunity. Though perceptions of a common European security narrative 
clearly diverged from where they had been in 1990, how the OSCE institutionalized and 
who sustained norms showed that the process had persisted. Much like the N+N block of 
the CSCE process, small states from 1990-2004 maintained norms and institutional 
continuity during periods of low political will.  
4.2 CPC - Conflict Prevention Center 
One of the first CSCE structures to develop in the early 1990’s and arguably the 
most important to the identity and practicality of the CSCE/OSCE, was the Conflict 
Prevention Center (CPC). Though the primary negotiations for Nagorno-Karabakh within 
the Minsk Group are political and diplomatic, the CPC is mandated with ensuring the 
functional aspects of any agreement. The CPC represents one of the two OSCE organs 
currently tasked with implementing the PKO and larger conflict management initiatives 
that grew out of the early 1990’s. This narrative will work as a contextual foundation for 
understanding the OSCE’s focus on operational matters and interest in a PKO in Nagorno-
Karabakh. 
Building a Foundation 
The CPC gained its mandate at the 1990 Charter of Paris, where the functionality of 
the organ began to be shaped. In its initial form, the CPC was tasked with facilitating 
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) between member states, creating a 
communications network for dispersing and collecting information in this sphere. 
Arguably, this was one of the most significant points of cooperation post 1975 and 
continues to be one of the institutional priorities to this day.252 The Paris document moved 
to make the free flow of military information an institutional priority and function by 
creating a secretariat in pursuit of these activities. This new office included a director and 
two officers to oversee the process, as well as an open amount of administrative and 
technical personnel for implementing structural components. The CPC’s first chair was 
Yugoslavia, who was a major proponent of a potential CPC during the 1973-75 CSCE 
process. During the CSCE process, Yugoslavia lobbied for the sharing of military 
information among participating states, which became one of the first responsibilities of the 
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CPC. 253 Ominously, Yugoslavia soon dissolved, becoming one of the first tests of CSCE 
conflict management and the CPC.  
The construction of a CPC was the antithesis to the expansion of old institutions 
such as NATO, preferred by the first Bush administration to maintain American input in 
European affairs. Though the CSCE was not a completely new player in European security 
politics, attempting to build new institutions on what had only previously been a ‘traveling 
circus,’ was something that did not exude confidence from the US or those with a vested 
interest in a NATO security community. 
The following year, at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers in Berlin, the 
CPC was again chosen to facilitate the functionality of a CSCE vision that had been 
initiated in congress with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. From 1978-1992, the CSCE 
assembled Meeting of Experts on the peaceful settlement of disputes (PSD), to collect best 
practices and facilitate regional practitioners. The process began in 1978 Montreux, 
Switzerland where eight general points for dialog were established for conflict resolution. 
The PSD, which was a Swiss initiative first raised during the CSCE process in Geneva 
1973, became one of the CSCE’s conflict resolution tools in the early 1990’s. It would be at 
the Malta meetings in 1991 that the points of 1978 were expanded and written into 
provisions for a CSCE procedure for political settlements of disputes. This outlined a 
functional diplomatic mechanism to enact what had only been theory over the past 25 
years.254 Participating states’ ministers at Berlin in 1991 tasked the newly created CPC with 
being the nominating institution, responsible for administrating the new PSD procedures 
and forums, known as the Valletta Mechanism.255 Though these institutions did not grown 
to be the cornerstone of a new OSCE, as the Valletta Mechanism has never been 
implemented, it was a signal of a new political will and a test of member states willingness 
to further institutionalize the CPC.256 Though there were few practical implications of these 
early initiatives, they represent the “euphoria in Europe about the specific European 
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essence about democracy and the rule of law.” 257 They also contextualize the OSCE’s 
intent to take on harder security measures and involvement in the NK conflict within a 
wider story of institutionalization. 
Pushing forward, the Prague meetings of the Council of Ministers furthered the 
agenda and ambition for the CPC as a primary CSCE conflict management tool. While 
Berlin may have represented a specific European essence of democracy and rule of law, 
Prague in 1992 represented more practical measures. The council requested the Consulting 
Committee of the CPC “serve as a forum in the security field wherein the CSCE 
participating states will conduct comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues 
with politico-military implications.” The CPC became responsible for implementing all fact 
finding missions and conducting multilateral cooperation with international institutions 
such as the UN, NATO, and Western European Union.258 The ambitions not only shaped 
the CPC, they also planted seeds for future forums that would be pivotal in the ongoing 
negotiation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Consulting Committee after 1993 
became the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and a leading forum for consistently 
discussing political-military affairs among participating states.259  
The idea that the CPC should be a structure for leading cooperation with external 
institutions was also intriguing. Throughout the NK negotiation process, a narrative of 
cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other post-Soviet 
security structures emerged as a result of the competition shown in chapter two. This 
potential cooperation, as shown in the third party PKO discussion, questioned and amended 
the vision various participating states may have had for the CSCE. Because of the NATO 
aspirations of former WP countries, as well as the pro-NATO preference from the US, it is 
plausible that the CSCE had to position itself within a growing EU institutional RSC to 
achieve its short term goals of institutionalization. There was also the simultaneous need to 
incorporate the diverging Russian narrative into the consolidated ‘back to Europe’ mantra.  
Due to these differences, the CPC in a sense became polemic, none the less making efforts 
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to validate Russian concerns.260 To observers at the time, it seemed that the participating 
states pursued these goals tentatively and with little actual knowledge of how to apply these 
new strategies in Russia’s perceived RSC.261 Regardless of the conviction of political will, 
the decisions made in Prague put the CPC at the center of future institutionalization and the 
OSCE’s perceived ability to enforce conflict mediation, contesting NATO dominance. 
With the traction gained in January 1992, the determination to continue the 
democratization of diplomacy continued with the Helsinki Summit and the Third Meeting 
of Ministers in Stockholm in December of the same year. With the overarching vision of 
improving the capacity of CSCE conflict mediations mechanisms, such as the CPC, there 
was a dedication to internalizing the ‘European essence of democracy,’ without creating an 
overly bureaucratic structure. The second Helsinki Summit showed political will for further 
institutionalization as well as international recognition of the structures that were being 
built, specifically the CPC and Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR). There were also further conversations among participating states about a more 
developed communications network for emergency situations to be incorporated into the 
CPC structure to complement the communication network used for sharing military 
information (based on the original Yugoslav proposal in 1973-75). Finally, regarding CSCE 
entrance into the field of peacekeeping, the CPC was mandated with beginning the early 
planning stages and collecting recommendations for financial modalities for a PKO.262 This 
request was part of the larger narrative of institutionalization and creation of a chain of 
command within the institution to strengthen the multinational secretariat.  
Helsinki II paralleled the shifting relations between Russia and the CSCE regarding 
Russia’s right to mediate conflicts in its perceived RSC. The Helsinki Summit and 
additional mandates for the CPC represented a direct response to the Italian Villa Madama 
emergency preliminary meetings in June of 1992 (see page 42-43).  These initial meetings 
of the CSCE Minsk Group brought the issues of a CSCE PKO and a comprehensive CSCE 
involvement in the traditionally Soviet RSC into the lime light. Villa Madama also hinted at 
how different member states’ interests might dictate conflict mediation, especially if there 
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was no set structure or process in place.263 Helsinki was an attempt to address the informal 
conversations begun in Rome. With more formal, structural measures taken in general 
forums, the power of individual member states in any mediation process was theoretically 
limited. 
 The functional aspects of the requests made in July at Helsinki were internally 
fulfilled in Stockholm that December. It was this concluding document that publicly 
furthered the conversation on potential forms of peacekeeping at the ministerial level, 
requesting “the Conflict Prevention Centre to take rapid steps to strengthen its ability to 
provide operational support for CSCE preventive diplomacy missions and peacekeeping 
activities.”264 The missed opportunity for a political agreement between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan at Stockholm also represented a further realization that there needed to be firm 
commitments from the CSCE regarding security guaranties following any political 
agreement. As the conflict of mediation between the CSCE and Russia escalated, the CSCE 
understood the need to present itself as a legitimate security provider through institutional 
ability:  
They [the Ministers] reviewed experience with the instruments for early warning, 
conflict prevention and crisis management, in particular in the field of preventive 
diplomacy. They noted that, in association with efforts to bring about political 
solutions, stability can be enhanced by armed contingents for peacekeeping 
purposes.265 
The commentary on a further PKO to specifically include the possibility of armed 
contingents highlighted the faction of participating states pushing for a firmer stand by the 
CSCE in terms of a functional aspect of the institution. In the context of the ‘Kozyrev 
speech’ and Russia’s warning of what 1993 would  look like, a presentation of the CSCE’s 
potential interest in developing hard security measures was a statement on the gravity 
participating states ascribed to the CSCE as a legitimate security provider in a traditionally 
Russian RSC.  
The tempered response by the participating states at Helsinki and Stockholm in July 
and December 1992 was a reflection of the political will exhibited in Rome surrounding 
preliminary NK talks. It also displayed an understanding of the political impact creating 
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such structures and concrete powers could have on specific member states. The CSCE was 
finding its place in a post-Cold War order and began to shift its focus from stabilizing 
solely Europe, to a wider perspective. Though it was slow and not at a pace necessary to 
capitalize on windows of opportunity in conflicts such as Karabakh, af Ugglas recalled in 
1993, “we are making steady but unspectacular progress in improving the conflict 
management capability of the international community.”266 
 The culmination of these four years of political will and what was defined as a 
democratic euphoria following the end of the Cold War climaxed in Budapest and the 
subsequent Hungarian Chairmanship. The conference moved to make itself an organization, 
seeking a special place in the new post-Cold War order.267  
Nuancing the Foundation 
 Following Budapest, mention of CPC institutionalization began to decrease in 
Ministerial Council meetings and summits. The Lisbon Summit in 1996 lacked the 
traditional subjection of OSCE institutions to constant revision, representing a conceptual 
stabilization of the OSCE conflict management foundation.268 While the mention of 
peacekeeping had a deep, reflective conversation from 1996-2003 in a variety of forums 
including the FSC, the initial search for institutional legitimacy through functionality 
seemed to have been achieved. New developments from 1996-2003 influenced the ongoing 
evolution of the CPC, but the most significant advancements shaped by consensus political 
will were achieved prior to the Lisbon Summit of 1996. The post-1996 CPC evolution was 
only a reaffirmation of prior values, defenses of said values, and institutional support for 
previously agreed upon norms and mandates in the face of marginal and regressive political 
will. The CPC became the foundation of functionality and institutional ability necessary for 
all future debates on the PKO mandate. 
Many of the FSC and HLPG concerns from 1995-2000 were reflected in an 
administrative shift in the CPC around 2000, when the OSCE had its largest budget in 
history. For example, as of 1998, the CPC began taking further responsibility for functional 
aspects of a larger OSCE bureaucracy when the Permanent Council (PC- principle decision 
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making body of the OSCE) decided to merge the CPC with the Department of General 
Affairs.269 While the substance of conflict resolution debates occurred in the political 
forums such as the Minsk Group, functional capacities continued to develop and be 
streamlined within the CPC. As a consequence, the CPC cultivated a voice of authority on 
the OSCE’s functional ability to implement any political agreement. 
In line with this trend of institutionalization, an Operation Centre was set up in 
2000, serving “as a planning cell for future missions and field operations; it prepares the 
deployment of new missions/field operations in case the Permanent Council has decided on 
such an operation.”270 There were also minor reorganizations within the Mission Program 
Section (MPS), or the department of the CPC responsible for all OSCE field missions. 
These bureaucratic reorganizations renamed the MPS program director the deputy director 
of the CPC, further intertwining the significance of field operations with the organizations 
overall conflict management mandate. The change to field operation structures within the 
CPC was significant because these shifts, in a period of financial support for the institution, 
can be viewed as another way of internalizing norms of functional conflict management.   
This further CPC institutionalization can be seen as an indirect response to the 
commentary by the US and other participating states concerning the funding and command 
structure of an OSCE PKO. As the CPC was mandated to facilitate the command structure 
of any PKO, the stability and strength of the CPC signified an interest in lasting mediation 
efforts and eventual post-conflict rehabilitation similar to the proven OSCE mission 
program model. The continued strengthening of the CPC also allowed the institution to take 
stronger stances on the OSCE’s ability to implement any hypothetical multinational OSCE 
PKOs. This will be seen in the FSC debate where the voice of the CPC’s Operation 
Planning Unit (OPU) further highlights the ability of the CPC to realize the PKO mandate, 
even when consistent doubt was present from participating states. 
 As of 2004, the CPC constructed a multitude of subsections. There was: a liaison 
for OSCE Field Activities in the MPS mentioned earlier, a project planning, evaluation and 
development area from the Project Co-ordination Cell (PCC), operation planning and 
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analysis from the Operations Planning Unit (OPU), a situation room for 24-hour contact 
between senior staff and field operations, a FSC Support Unit (FSC SU) for analysis and 
support of small arms and light weapons initiatives, and the original OSCE 
communications network.  By 2004, the CPC amassed a substantial functional ability and 
readiness to maintain and deploy field operations.  Though the perception and purpose of 
field operations regarding their implications among member states constantly differed, they 
continue to be the cornerstone of the OSCE.271 These structures gave the OSCE ability to 
fulfill mandates agreed upon my member states, but also the ability to offer alternative 
forums for political dialog when political will declined in specific venues. Thus, when 
diplomacy fails in one forum, the institution can play a role and facilitate continued 
discussion and progress on the same issue from different angels in other forums. 
Even as the CPC continued to grow and give indirect support for a political solution 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, the institution was still restricted by its mandates. With the opening 
of OSCE missions in Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 2000’s, the OSCE continued its 
multifaceted approach to supporting a political resolution. Though these offices were not 
associated with the Minsk Group negotiations, they did deal with democratization and 
human rights, while also supporting the long term goal of enhancing social reconciliation.272 
This perspective of Special Representative Andrzej Kasprzyk, though often viewed as an 
excuse for not taking concrete action, coincides with a longer vision of post-Cold War 
OSCE multidimensional conflict mediation. His account aligns with the general premises 
of preventative diplomacy as a model for engaging in long term mediation associated with 
stability and nation building. This idealist vision was also meet with fears from Russia.  
Russian Ambassador to the OSCE from 2004-2008, Alexey Borodavkin, commented that 
the equality of the three dimensions had been eroded and the OSCE was spending and 
unfair amount of resources to act East of Vienna.273 This account highlights a part of the 
Russian narrative where human rights were becoming increasingly securitized. 
Subsequently Borodavkin’s account helps understand how Russia might have come to 
interpret ongoing OSCE involvement in the region as well as future institutional evolution 
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for addressing conflict East of Vienna, such as the PKO debate.  If observed from the 
perspective of nation building and security, human rights issues may have also been 
securitized because of the narrative (conscious or subconscious) Russia remembered 
regarding their role in the establishment of Armenian and Azerbaijani national and states 
consciousness. With the OSCE bringing a new set of values to the region, uncertainty about 
what impact this would have on both nations, as well as their strategic culture, may have 
led to the further securitization of OSCE involvement in Russian security culture. 
While small states worked to create the CSCE as a cooperative conflict management 
forum and a new structure for European security, counter efforts also worked to maintain 
status quo structures. As former WP states gained access to NATO and the EC in 2004, the 
OSCE as an institution had to work much harder than the CSCE as a forum to sustain 
prominence. Thus, the narrative of the OSCE and mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh post 
1999 took on a new character. Ideals of collective security shifted in meaning with NATO 
and the EU again expanding, changing the perceptions of a European security environment 
and how different actors wanted to define European Security.  
4.3 FSC – Forum for Security Cooperation 
The FSC evolved out of the Consultative Committee (CC) of the CPC. The CC, 
which gained its mandate at Paris 1990, was tasked with being the CSCE's all-inclusive 
forum for arms negotiations until Helsinki 1992. It was the most comprehensive body of 
the CSCE so far, tasked with meeting at least once a month with a monthly rotating chair. It 
was responsible for being the member states' voice in the activities of the new CPC. The 
work of the CC was highly ambitious at the time, with the CC being politically responsible 
for the functionality of the CPC, which in turn was responsible for all CSBM's and the 
CSCE communications network (exchange of military information). The intent was to 
make an independent forum for ongoing Basket I negotiations, which was a primary focus 
of the CSCE prior to 1990.274 The CC was only considered a temporary forum, coinciding 
with the understanding arrived at in Paris 1990, that the CSCE would need continual 
institutional evolution to meet the security needs of a shifting Europe. 
At Helsinki II 1992, the FSC became one of the central forums of the CSCE/OSCE 
as a first-basket arms control forum. With the shifting nature of the CSCE, conflict in the 
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CSCE area, and the need for a security guarantor in the NIS, "the participating States have 
decided to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, with a strengthened 
Conflict Prevention Centre, as an integral part of the CSCE."275 In parallel with CPC 
consolidation, the new FSC as an independent forum allowed the CPC to focus on 
preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention as an inter-basket (disciplinary) project. 
This evolution continued to become controversial in the view of the Russian Federation, as 
they voiced their opinion various times that security was a purely Basket I issue.276 This 
perception of the CSCE as a competing security provider via Basket III initiatives in the 
NIS, presented itself in various RF FSC statement, influencing how and where a NK PKO 
was debated and consequently, how the CSCE/OSCE evolved. 
At the Lisbon Summit in 1996, the FSC gained a mandated to utilize funds from the 
CPC that allowed it to take formal actions, further defining the capacity of OSCE Basket I 
conflict mediation. Also at Lisbon, the region ability of the FSC was further defined in 
terms of conflict prevention, stating that "in particular, the FSC may look at ways at making 
more effective use of its decision on 'Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis 
Situations'."277 With initial intent of the FSC to support the communication aspects (Open 
Skies and CBSM) of the CPC, the eventual growth of the FSC out of its initial purpose 
comments on the ambitious nature of CSCE/OSCE evolution. It also underscored the 
ability of specific participating states to position themselves to influence the evolution of 
these forums away from, or towards, inter-basket security measures, thus setting conditions 
for competing visions of how collective security should be defined. Therefore, the way in 
which the new FSC interacted with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after 1996 exhibited this 
evolution, further commenting on Halonen's assertion that the NK conflict stood as a 
historic acid test for the OSCE.278 
The PKO Debate 10 Years On 
 After the Porto Ministerial Conference of 2002, the FSC was tasked with facilitating 
the review of the OSCE’s role in the field of peacekeeping. While the CSCE/OSCE played 
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a large role in the Yugoslav conflict, as well as various other post-Soviet conflicts, the 
implementation of hard security guaranties, such as multinational peacekeeping battalions, 
had yet to occur. The Porto final document points to the formal acknowledgment of an 
interest in a renewed political process surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh by participating 
states, requesting a reflection on the 1992 Helsinki mandate for peacekeeping. It also 
highlighted Russia’s part in restarting the PKO debate.279 Hence, this documented marked 
the beginning of a period of renewed political interest in discussing the peacekeeping 
mandate within OSCE political forums. 
Though 2002 Porto showed a renewed spark for political dialogue, the OSCE still 
needed to overcome the historic disagreement from various delegations, especially the 
Americans and Russians, about the ability of the OSCE to produce hard security measures. 
Prior to the Porto mandate in 2002, the Russian delegation brought up the issue of a PKO in 
the FSC. Once through a food for thought paper and once critiquing the lack of political 
debate that occurred (or had not occurred) on the issue over the past five years. The food 
for thought paper outlined Russia’s interest in resurrecting the idea that any OSCE PKO 
should be subordinate to other international or regional structures, such as the UN or CIS 
because of their practical experience with PKOs.280 By validating an OSCE PKO through 
the UN or CIS, Russia would effectively gain the potential for use of force, or direct 
command and control over any CIS PKO. This once again opened the possibility of 
attaining one, if not two, of their outstanding concerns from Budapest 1994.  
Member of the Russian delegation Andrei Vorobiev went on to state that Russia 
believed the 1992 mandate to be outdated and any PKO should be planned and 
implemented by the PC with close cooperation with the FSC.281 The new structure for PKO 
planning and implementation proposed by the Russian Federation would directly contradict 
the purpose of OSCE institutional evolution and consolidation that occurred from 1990-
2002. Restructuring a command structure as such would also negate the need for an 
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independent military planning arm, such as the HLPG, and further privilege the first-
dimension of security by elevating the status of the FSC in any new PKO mandate. 
Favoring the FSC in PKO planning would also give Russia a stronger bilateral voice in 
PKO organization. 
While this is apparent in particular archival documents, these points were not lost on 
participating states of the time. The Swiss delegation responded to the Russian delegation 
in the first week of October leading up to the Porto Ministerial Meeting in December, 
questioning the need for change in the command and control structure of any potential 
PKO.282 As this questioning restarted debate that had faltered in 1995, Switzerland’s 
initiatives throughout this period can be taken as part of the Swiss narrative’s turn back to 
credible impartiality. This supported both the integrity of institutional evolution, as well as 
attempts to incorporation the Russia narrative into the dominant strains of European 
security that began to solidify after the 1990’s. The possibility of a renewed PKO debate 
also offered hope for minimal cooperation after the break seen in 1999. 
Following the statement by the Swiss delegation, the Armenian Delegation also 
responded to the Russian Food-For-Thought-Paper the preceding week. In the Armenian 
comments, there is alignment with Russia in saying that the 1992 PKO mandate had never 
been implemented and needed to be reviewed. At the same time, they reaffirmed support 
for the HLPG and its application outside of the NK region, with the possibility of 
cooperation with other international organizations. 283 This statement was outwardly coded 
with loyalty to Russian as a regional security guarantor by alluding to the third party PKO 
debate of 1992-1993. It also subtly distorted Russian goals by neglecting to mention the 
HLPG as subordinate to the Minsk Group, similar to Directive Six, treating the HLPG as an 
independent OSCE organ and supporting its work in a wider institutional context. This 
tactic of allegiance and parallel openness to an alternative security guarantor if the situation 
arose was similar to the presentation the Armenian delegation put on at the Villa Madama 
emergency meetings of the Minsk Group in Rome, 1992. This also possibly highlights the 
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solidification of a new strategic culture in Armenia, acknowledging Russia’s inherent 
position as a RSC center,284 but also looking to international organizations for potential 
leverage in domestic policy due to its dependence on regional security.  
The re-initiation of the PKO debate in the summer of 2002 was directly addressed 
by the Council of Ministers at Porto in December. A review of the 1992 PKO mandate 
became an OSCE priority for 2003, with the FSC requested as a primary actor in this 
process. This invigorated debate, allowing for further political and institutional evolution. 
Beginning in 2003, the FSC began creating new structural forums for the discussion and 
review of the OSCE’s capacity to implement the 1992 PKO mandate. Three new working 
groups, or Chef de files, were assigned to oversee three thematic clusters: 1) FSC 
contributions to the role in the field of peacekeeping operations 2) FSC contribution for the 
annual security review conference 3) FSC contribution for the OSCE strategy on threat and 
challenges to security for the 21st century. From looking at the priorities of the working 
groups initiated after Porto, the FSC showed broad interest in taking a more active role in 
OSCE application of peacekeeping norms. It is also interesting to note that while Russia 
was the first to express interest in such a process, the Russian Federation was not 
responsible for chairing any of the FSC Chef de file groups. Rather the Swedish, 
Belarusian, and Belgium delegation took responsibility for chairing the groups 
respectively.285 These leadership positions give the impression that the questions raised by 
the Swiss delegation were taken seriously, reinvigorating political interest surrounding the 
OSCE PKO mandate. 
The Finnish delegation subsequently created the informal Group of Friends within 
the FSC. This working group, chaired by the Finnish Ambassador, served as a forum for 
participating states to present their perspectives, as well as the three Chief de Files to report 
back to the broader assembly. This support for the OSCE PKO fits into a longer narrative 
of Finland in the OSCE, sustaining to this day with the assertion as of 2015 that the PKO 
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plans for any peace in Nagorno-Karabakh remain in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.286 
As the Swiss delegation tempered the discussion the year before, they also framed 
the beginning of the 2003 FSC debates with similar conceptual questions. In February of 
2003 the Swiss delegation outlined the collective purpose as a need to answer the following 
questions: when comparing 1992 and 2003, what is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different? What would implementing the 1992 PKO mandate imply for the institution, as 
well as existing instruments such as the HLPG? Is this mandate still valid in ensuring peace 
in troubled regions? What are the needs and the limitations for the OSCE in going beyond 
this mandate? Should the OSCE commit itself to extensive peacekeeping, or should it focus 
on its limited peacekeeping experiences from the last decade?287 These questions were 
fundamental in framing the debate throughout 2003, not only questioning the OSCE’s 
vision for a wider security architecture, but also asking if the existing norms and mandates 
that were created with high political will could be and should be discarded. Because of the 
unfinished nature of the NK negotiation process, a reassessment of institutional norms and 
values could have had detrimental effects on the legitimacy of the OSCE as a security 
guarantor in the region. Switzerland was effectively playing the role of mediator, making 
room for a PKO debate to be revived, simultaneously placing Russian initiatives in a larger 
historic context and using the opportunity for institutional reflection.  
In the same informal meeting of friends, the Spanish Delegation requested that there 
be a conversation about PKOs as a subsidiary to peace-building.288 This remark is 
interpreted as a commitment to the interdisciplinary nature of OSCE conflict resolution and 
hope that the form of preventative diplomacy and interdimensional security that had 
evolved over the past decade would sustain. It is also seen as interest in sustaining such 
conflict management tools so that they would not be abandoned simply for a prioritization 
of Basket I. This interpretation of the Spanish delegation’s statement, expressing a 
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commitment to a specific brand of OSCE conflict resolution, as well as prioritizing 
inclusion of alternative baskets in PKO’s, is also supported by the Spanish CiO in 2007 and 
their support of the HLPG.289  
The Austrian Delegation’s interest in a cross-dimensional or multidimensional 
approach to peacekeeping aligned itself with the Spanish delegations comments during the 
month of February. The Austrians expressed confidence in how such a multidimensional 
conflict management strategy could transform traditional, static peacekeeping into peace 
consolidation, giving the OSCE comparative advantage and fulfilling the visions of Paris, 
Helsinki, and Budapest.290 The sentiment that seemed to immediately arise was against the 
initial suppositions of the Russian Federation statement the year before, which had 
proposed that the dimensions of peacekeeping be distinctly divided and focused in the 
FSC.291  While the interest of reassessing the first PKO mandate seemed to be an affront to 
institutionally establish norms, political will began to consolidate against such proposals, 
exhibiting the strength norms had through reassertion. 
Though there was clear support for the established norms and structural 
interconnectedness in OSCE conflict mediation, the Russian delegation was not finished 
testing their salience. Representatives from the Russian Federation continued to openly 
assert their priorities, putting a stake in the ground that Russian interest lay in the first 
dimension.292 The longer political discussion of Russian power and preoccupation with 
international status suggests that the early 2000’s was a period of re-solidification of 
Russian identity within Russian domestic politics, similar to growing influence of hardline 
factions in 1993. Especially after how certain corners of the Russian elite perceived the 
OSCE bullying its way into Chechnya and forcing the human dimension on them, there was 
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the feeling that Russian great power status had been violated.293 Statements surrounding the 
OSCE PKO discussion give hints that Russia once again felt secure in the political-military 
dimension after the chaos of the early 1990’s. Basket I was Russia’s claim to great power 
status, as well as legitimacy in a Russian centered South Caucasus RSC.294 The fact that 
political military supremacy was rhetorically asserted as a primary interest of Russia in the 
OSCE speaks to a longer narrative of a privileged position due to material strength. Actors 
such as the US also utilized this narrative, further highlighting some actors interest in a 
return of the geopolitical story discussed earlier.  
 The debate continued in the summer of 2003, when the Dutch CiO reasserted their 
interest in the debate by reissuing their own Food-for-Thought Paper in June. This paper 
restated the various PKO options available to the OSCE, but placed additional emphasis on 
police operations as an evolving tool for OSCE led post-conflict rehabilitation.295 This 
institutional policy analysis paper was followed up by a commentary from the Russian 
Delegation, who again reasserted the need for a new command and control structure for a 
PKO, seemingly disregarding the wider, inter-dimensional discussion that was taking 
place.296 Interestingly enough, the police operations found traction and are a critical piece of 
OSCE involvement in an evolving PKO discussion today for Ukraine.297 
 One month later the CPC circulated a paper on the capabilities of the OSCE to 
deploy and run a PKO. This perspective is interesting within the context of the FSC debate 
because it represents the theoretically impartial perspective of the institution and an internal 
perception on their own ability to fulfill the 1992 mandate. The majority of emphasis in the 
CPC paper focused on the political process rather than the post-agreement implementation 
stage. The points raised by the CPC emphasized the political framework of any OSCE 
PKO, focusing on the need to agree upon a single option for an OSCE PKO prior to 
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implementation. The CPC understood the deadlock that occurred from 1995-1997 over the 
four options presented by the HLPG and saw this as one issue which diminished political 
will surrounding OSCE mediation of NK from 1997-2001. During the political discussion 
within the FSC, there was also a comment that the capacity of the CPC and OSCE to 
facilitate a PKO was not sufficient. This perception was addressed by the CPC, which 
commented on the creation of new structures such as the OPU and Rapid Expert Assistance 
and Co-Operation Team (REACT), used to quickly fill OSCE missions as conflict arose. At 
the time, these structures were in the process of developing so as to address structural issues 
that still existed within OSCE conflict management, explicitly an institutional inability to 
fully staff missions in a short period of time. 298 Irrespective, the CPC could still 
theoretically work to facilitate a PKO. Most significantly, there was also commentary that 
the OSCE should shift from single-application peacekeeping plans, to multi-application so 
that any PKO planning, which had been a focus of over a decade’s worth of work by 2003, 
could be reused. This included a recommendation to expand the mandate of the HLPG to 
focus on other conflicts outside of NK.299 The ability to reapply such planning to other 
conflict scenarios would increase the impact, ability, and flexibility of the OSCE for future 
operations. While the role of the OPU is highlighted in this analysis, the paper nonetheless 
concluded that the OSCE currently did not have the capacity to implement a PKO, but did 
have the ability to cooperate with other international organizations.  
The CPC OPU paper is a highly telling document, as it gave an institutional push to 
the FSC political debate occurring in the summer of 2003. It reasserted the norms and intent 
of institution leadership for maintaining the OSCE as a conflict management body on the 
cutting edge of peacekeeping, with additional hope to continue expanding the mandate of 
1992. While the CPC and OPU understood that their work was contingent on political will, 
participating states were not the only actors who defended and reinforced institutional 
norms.  
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These potential nuances of the institutions ability to advocate for specific mediation 
courses are not always apparent. Authors such as Meier utilized the same documents, but 
interpreted them differently, possibly due to an undervaluation of OSCE institutional 
evolution. Meier presents the CPC OPU document presented above, commenting on the 
ability for the OSCE to implement one of the four PKO options presented by the HLPG.300 
Meier interprets the document stating: 
The documents conclude that the OSCE has neither the experience nor the 
operational capacity to deploy armed PKOs of the blue helmet type. Should the 
participating States decide to field armed PKOs, substantial and costly enhancement 
of the Secretariat’s operational capacity would be needed. Or – as a second 
possibility – so-called turnkey operations could be envisaged. Participating States or 
other organizations would have to provide the OSCE with fully formed and trained 
units that are interoperable as well as operationally and logistically self-
sustaining.301 
Meier neglects much of the analysis presented in this paper, which focused on the OPU’s 
references to the CPC’s willingness to: further consolidate their power for future PKO 
planning, possibly make any NK PKO planning structurally reusable, and assert that 
various organs were already moving in that direction. Though Meier presents a highly 
valuable analysis (and highly influential to the study being written here), due to the lack of 
HLPG and CPC documents from the 1990’s in Meier’s analysis, documents are interpreted 
differently. 
 Meier also raises a very controversial argument with her interpretation of 
documents associated with this FSC debate. She asserts that:  
Western countries, in particular, repeatedly questioned the added value of OSCE 
engagement in peacekeeping. Instead of duplicating structures which already exist 
elsewhere, the OSCE would be better advised to build on its well-known expertise 
in early warning and conflict prevention. Furthermore, the financial implications of 
potential OSCE engagement in peacekeeping were repeatedly underlined. 
Considering the fact that the Organization lacks the necessary planning capacity as 
well as an appropriate logistical support system, substantial financial investment 
would be required to enable the Secretariat to deploy and operate military PKOs. 302   
 Meier quotes one archival document emanating from the Italian delegation, presenting a 
statement on behalf of the EU, to support this claim, as well as a US and then Finnish 
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statement. The US statement is not surprising, but the conclusion Meier draws from the 
Italian and Finnish documents, interpreting them as the interests of all ‘Western countries’, 
echoes CSCE analysis dependent on block politics of the Cold War. The debate presented 
above highlights the variety of opinions within ‘the West’ as well as a general positive 
attitude towards an OSCE PKO. As this longer analysis has shown, though member states 
such as Finland may have brought up issues such as funding, that did not necessarily imply 
that they were against armed OSCE PKOs. If anything, by bringing the issue to a forum, it 
shows a form of leadership needed to begin conversation on tough issues so that a PKO in 
its intended, 1995 form could be realized. This reading was supported by both Timo 
Kantala and Ilkka Kanerva in different panel discussions of Finland’s role in Peacekeeping 
and the OSCE.303 Thus, Meier neglects a deeper reading of strategic culture and simplifies 
the narratives specific actors wanted to write. 
Following this seminal CPC/OPU paper, the Swedish Delegation brought up legal 
concerns with an OSCE PKO, all points that the US used in 1997. There concerns orbited 
around issues with the legality of a status of forces agreement (SOFA), terms of reference 
(ToR), memorandum of understanding (MoU), and rules of engagement (RoE).304 These 
were all issues that killed the PKO debate in 1995-1997. With a period of moderate 
political will and the commentary from the CPC in 2002-2003, it seemed that participating 
states were prepared to try once again to discuss the contentious issues that brought 
conversation to a halt five years before (and continue to be issues to this day). The SOFA 
debate is also a piece Meier discusses, but she again interprets it as a reason ‘Western 
states’ were against an OSCE PKO. She cites one archival document from the Finnish 
delegation to represent the entirety of ‘Western opinion’. While there were concerns 
regarding the SOFA, as shown here, when read in a longer PKO narrative, it was a 
necessary concern that needed to be addressed so as to achieve consensus. Similar to how 
the Swiss delegation’s statements were interpreted to offered reflective questions in 
promoting debate, Sweden’s and Finland’s statements can also be understood in this frame. 
With their memory of the competition over mediation in the 1990’s and the limited 
progress made at Key West in 2001, Sweden and Finland may have also looked to foster 
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discussion in anticipation of a window of opportunity. Along with the hope seen in HLPG 
Directive Seven issued in 2003 (page 76-79), these statements can also be read as 
containing hope of finding common ground with Russia on a PKO so as not to descend 
back to the instability that hampered mediation prior to 1994. Controversially, Meier reads 
these documents as dissenting opinions against a PKO, overlooking Finland’s role as a 
bridge, Sweden’s commitment the norms of preventative diplomacy, as well as the longer 
narrative of leadership they both wrote in regards to NK mediation and PKO facilitation. 
The Swedes also mentioned the HLPG in their working paper, but only in the 
capacity that they would support the FSC in composing recommendations for the 2003 
Maastricht Ministerial Council.305 It was clear in member state documents that there was 
not the political will needed to further expand the HLPG mandate at the time. As is seen in 
the HLPG discussion, the OSCE organ was fighting just to reinvigorate participating states 
will to fund HLPG monitoring missions to the region. The request of the Swedish 
delegation for the expertise of the HLPG is interesting because it can be read as a way to 
intertwine old structures with new. By involving the HLPG in the FSC review, the Swedish 
delegation diplomatically advocated for the co-evolution of OSCE mediation structures and 
political forums even though the HLPG was a contentious issue in the command and 
control debate. The HLPG eventually regained regional access in 2005. Though Sweden 
may have helped reincorporate Russia into the discussion by raising SOFA issues, their 
commitment to the HLPG can be interpreted as a reassertion of their commitment to the 
original PKO mandate regarding command and control. 
The year of debate in the FSC was concluded with the US Chair’s summary, 
commenting on the work of all FSC Chef de Files from January to November of 2003 in 
preparation for Maastricht in December. While the statement was generally impartial, the 
concluding remarks focus on the lack of consensus achieved over the year and highlighted 
that issues remained with the proposed PKO options. Their positive point was to recognize 
that there were now more informed options on the table.306 While political will may not 
have been that of 1990-1994 during the European euphoria, the limited political will was 
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significant in doing exactly what the American Delegation mentioned. The FSC debate 
created more informed options and resurrected the dialog for the ministers to once again put 
a PKO on the agenda in Maastricht. This disallowed established norms to wither into 
nothingness and reaffirmed the OSCE’s potential to support regional security, continuing to 
give confidence to Armenia and Azerbaijan that the OSCE could facilitate a PKO if a 
political peace was achieved. It should be noted that as of today, it is still the perspective of 
the OSCE Minsk group that an OSCE PKO will be responsible for post-conflict resolution 
after any political agreement. Due to a ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ no Minsk Group Co-Chair 
will donate peacekeepers to an OSCE PKO, inherently acknowledging that an armed PKO 
is still on the table.307 
The debate of 2002-2003 in the FSC offers a unique reflection on Russia’s 
interpretations of OSCE institutionalization. The FSC debate outlined here offers an initial 
instance where the impact of the Russian assertion that the OSCE had negatively 
institutionalized to support a particular narrative of security (first dimension) was seen. 
Russian interests in debating command and control as well as Basket I issues was 
seemingly channeled into a discussion resulting in the reaffirmation of established norms.  
While the Russian narrative of security associated with Basket I, though validated and 
engaged by Swiss, Finnish, and Swedish statements, was also countered by reaffirmation of 
support for inter-basket conflict management. Small states reaffirmed the norms of Paris 
and Budapest, attempting to incorporate Russia, albeit still on the terms of Paris 1990. 
Consequently, the debate over inter-basket conflict management continued to grow after 
2004, remaining a primary issue today. President Putin’s 2007 speech and Ambassador 
Borodavkin’s comments alluded to how entire baskets became securitized as part of 
diverging narratives of European security. Thus, helping explain why OSCE initiatives in 
the region become more securitized, with the OSCE Mission in Georgia leaving after 2008 
and the OSCE Offices in Baku and Yerevan closing in 2015 and 2017 respectively. Though 
these closures were not solely the result of Russian securitization of the OSCE in the 
region, the divergence of narratives and security values in the early 2000’s played a key 
role. Specifically with regard to how other actors in the region came to understand the 
OSCE in the frame of who provided security for the South Caucasus RSC. 
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5 Conclusion 
“The historic reconstruction of the development of the last twenty five years should be left 
to historians, although the outcome of this reconstruction may have effects on the further 
life of contemporary narratives.” 
Andrei Zagorski 2017 308 
 The story of institutional evolution in various CSCE/OSCE forums is critical in 
understanding how a multitude of ideas and narratives of European security were written in 
the 1990’s. Specifically the discourse of NK mediation and PKO debate exhibit that the 
investigation of institutions is beneficial for understanding the impact of said ideas on post-
Cold War security structures. This sub-strain is critical in understanding how certain ideas 
and parts of the institution became increasingly securitized alongside the diverging 
accounts of post-Cold War security. It is also critical in attempting to offer actors a deeper 
empathy for their negotiating partners.   
As narratives recounting the origin of conflict after the Cold War diverged, even the 
semblance of cooperation that was achieved in the early 1990’s changes meaning 
depending on who is writing history. In the words of Zagorski, “The debates over narratives 
should not be confused with the search for historic truth.”309  As such, the story offered here 
presents a particular vantage point in interpreting the conglomerate of narratives written 
through the CSCE/OSCE process of mediation and institutionalization surrounding NK. 
The CSCE/OSCE offers a specific repository for the security preferences of participating 
states and their statements and participation in debates reflect one discourse in the 
historiography of the past 25 years. 
In adding to the wider discussion on security narratives that is currently underway 
in the OSCE research community, this thesis adds a few points to the debate. 1) When 
considering the construction of new European security structures in the 1990’s, the 
institution (hear the CSCE/OSCE) is a necessary subject of investigation – actors’ 
narratives were inherently influenced by institutionalization and hence, the frame in which 
debate occurred.  2) The ability for small states to reassert norms and pursue 
institutionalization in support of a perceived consensus security narrative is significant in 
understanding the way in which actors came to understand the CSCE/OSCE. Those that 
                                                          
308 Zagorski 2017, 100. 
309 Ibid. 
 Reynolds 104 
 
took leadership roles seemingly had more ability to shape institutionalization, if only 
through the reassertion of previous norms. 3) By being able to consider security within the 
frame of a longer process such as the CSCE, rather than simply the liminal historic moment 
of ambiguity that defined the 1990’s, participating states were able to anchor there various 
narratives of security to an existing entity. This contemplation on memory asked highly 
relevant questions to how security identities are formed as a result of strategic culture as 
well as interpretations of history and could be beneficial for future studies. 
At the core of these conclusions is the role of small states. Discussed throughout 
this thesis, these actors effectively raised their voices in several OSCE forums to oppose, 
either subtly or directly, US and Russian unilateral attempts to direct institutional evolution 
and conflict management. Many states strayed from the idealist vision of European security 
established in 1990-1996, levitating towards NATO or entrenched RSC paradigms. 
Regardless, many were still willing to defend the spirit of Helsinki and the functionality of 
CSCE conflict management tools in preparation for new periods of high political will. That 
being said, the disagreement over which values should define European security was 
founded in differing historical interpretations of responsibility at the end of the Cold War, 
influencing how collective security was interpreted. Accordingly, this account asserts the 
significance an investigation of institutional evolution has for understanding a subset of 
post-Cold War security narratives.  
 The presentation of individual strategic cultures argued that new security interests 
and narratives were influenced by memory politics. Former N+N states’ positive memory 
of the latitude the CSCE offered them for personal security interests in a stricter block to 
block security paradigm of the Cold War. These memories helps explain the leadership role 
and responsibility such states took in CSCE/OSCE institutional evolution and conflict 
management. Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and ever so momentarily Yugoslavia are 
included in this group. 
The second loose grouping of interpretation consists of various former WP states.  
While having fond memories of the CSCE as a means for loosening the grip of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, they also had clearly stated goals of NATO membership. Their memory 
of the communist past was occasionally written as a dominant discourse of occupation. This 
is in opposition to a fluid and nuanced history where cooperation and collaboration was 
compared to complicity. This selective memory was reflected in the emerging ‘back to 
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Europe’ description that arose in opposition to ‘common European home’ narrative and a 
collective memory arguably achieved at the 1990 CSCE Paris summit. As the 1990’s 
continued, a collective security discourse with Russia became momentarily incompatible 
with the emerging memory politics for many of these post-communist states. Though 
NATO increasingly became the former WP countries’ definition for European security, 
their temporal dedication to and leadership in the CSCE/OSCE allowed for significant 
institutional structures to be erected in preparation for new periods of high political will. 
Poland, Czechoslovakia/Czechia, and Hungary are part of this story.  
Small states that were previously part of the NATO community also showed an 
interest and ability to sustain OSCE norms in periods of low political will. Though still 
sustaining their identity within the NATO security community, they offered support via 
leadership in the institutionalization process to sustain the idea of Europe agreed upon in 
Paris, Budapest, and Lisbon. The Netherlands and Denmark are in this group.  
Another significant meditation in this period was the meaning of Russia and how to 
treat the NIS. The strategic culture of Armenia and Azerbaijan alongside Russia’s (Soviet 
Union’s) part in supporting the growth of these nation-states is a significant consideration. 
This is particularly relevant when looking at how post-Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan 
struggled with writing new security stories. As the collapse of the USSR created a 
momentary power vacuum in the South Caucasus, both countries had to consider what their 
interest in a larger European idea was, as well as their ability to sustain domestic political 
legitimacy. The OSCE as a new European security idea conflicted with the historic 
perception of Russia and how security was to be achieved. While human rights and other 
development incentives may have been accepted by Armenia and Azerbaijan, when read 
through the respective outlooks of the political elite in the early 1990’s, the instability of 
each security culture raises questions regarding actual perceptions of their RSC. 
Participation in the CSCE was possibly just another tool to use as leverage in sustaining 
newly found sovereignty. That being said, as conservative and military factions regained 
footing in domestic Russian politics, the work of the OSCE in the region became further 
securitized. This subsequently limited Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s perceptions of the 
OSCE as a substantial security provider. Due to lingering ideas of domestic and 
international legitimacy, historically rooted in security relations with Russia, OSCE 
mediation and intervention in a South Caucasus RSC became a growing issue of 
 Reynolds 106 
 
securitization. Thus, over the course of the 1990’s in the South Caucasus, the idea of 
Europe remained a myth insomuch as solidifying sovereignty and defining security was a 
prerequisite to the debates continental Europe was having.  
The brief and limited array of narratives incorporated into this story do offer the 
conclusion that as of 2004, interest remained for a multi-application PKO plan. This 
meaning a PKO plan that could be applied to areas other than NK. While consensus could 
not be found on many issues such as SOFA, command and control, financing, etc., it did 
allow for the PKO debate to continue to progress. As the 2002-2003 FSC debate hinted at, 
though hard peacekeeping measures needed a special historic moment like the early 1990’s 
to gain consensus, police operations were a PKO form that allowed the debate to continue 
post 2004 in a more amicable direction.  
Further Study 
 These subsets of the larger NK mediation story are by no means comprehensive. 
Many of the above conclusions were only investigated in reference to the NK conflict and 
mediation.  For example, a deeper investigation of the CiO responsibility and action could 
possibly add additional support and nuance to the argumentation of small states taking 
sustained responsibility in defending the norms of the 1990’s, even though some looked to 
NATO for comprehensive security guaranties. The Polish CiO the year before their NATO 
ascension would be an interesting investigation, as well as the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, 
and Romanian CiOs in 1992, 1995, and 2001 respectively. This would also help look at the 
question of why the CiO mandate was restricted in 2002 after given greater leeway in 1994. 
On the other hand, the growing critical view of the first dimension by the Russian 
Federation embodied larger disagreements about how OSCE institutionalization had 
progressed. This may have influenced how the CiO position we resubordinated to strict 
consensus after Porto. These additional flows would undoubtedly offer new interpretive 
shades of memory and strategic culture, nuancing the interpretation of documents in the 
story offered here.   
 Further investigation into wider military modernization and force structure 
discussions remains an issue for further study. For example, there are various documents in 
the OSCE archive about force modernization from the Russian delegation as they attempt 
to reorganize the Soviet military. This most likely had an impact on Russia’s ability to 
produce PKOs, as well as their ability to coherently direct a command and control structure. 
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An analysis of the way in which these projects were presented to the OSCE, as well as a 
parallel investigation into how the Russian military was actually modernizing would be 
another interesting discourse for understanding the Russian narrative and self-perception as 
a security provider. It may also shed light on how they wanted to present that image to 
Europe in the context of diverging narratives and perceived securitization, penetration, and 
overlay in the post-Soviet Space.    
 In a similar vein, the SOFA, use of force, and command and control debates would 
be useful to track up to the current day. Recently, there has been talk within the UN 
regarding the legitimate use of force in PKO operations, giving UN PKOs the ability to 
take offensive action to enforce peace.310 This debate looks very similar to the form of 
peace Russia looked to enforce following the collapse of the Soviet Union in various 
regions. This then asks the reflective question: if peace enforcement is being considered as 
a legitimate proposal for contemporary UN PKOs, why was it interpreted as illegitimate 
when Russia utilized them in the 1990’s?  Of course there are differences between the UN 
and Russia in regards to political partiality, but it does raise questions for an interesting 
critique of the historical debates of CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping narratives and 
interpretations.  
As this thesis has shown, the evolution of one OSCE forum is inherently dependent 
on an understanding of the institution as a whole, as well as shifting memories, strategic 
culture, and the security identities of states involved in the discussion of norms. Therefore, 
any investigation into the OSCE from the perspective of HI and institutional evolution in 
the 1990’s is bound to have a commentary on the NK mediation process. Recognizing 
Nagorno-Karabakh as one of the OSCE’s foundational attempts and hence memories to 
take on conflict mediation is central to understanding the OSCE of today. Such a test was 
central to the importance of a young institution in the post-Cold War world and had 
institutional, structural, and normative implications for an understanding of post-Cold War 
Europe, as well as collective security memory politics. 
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